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Abstract
We analyze recent contributions to growth theory based on the model of ex-
panding variety of Romer (1990). In the ﬁrst part, we present diﬀerent versions of
the benchmark linear model with imperfect competition. These include the “lab-
equipment” model, “labor-for-intermediates” and “directed technical change”. We
review applications of the expanding variety framework to the analysis of interna-
tional technology diﬀusion, trade, cross-country productivity diﬀerences, ﬁnancial
development and ﬂuctuations. In many such applications, a key role is played by
complementarities in the process of innovation.
JEL Numbers: D92, E32, F12, F15, F43, G22, O11, O16, O31, O33, O41,
O47.
Keywords: appropriate technology, complementarity, cycles, convergence, di-
rected technical change, endogenous growth, expanding variety, ﬁnancial develop-
ment, imperfect competition, integration, innovation, intellectual property rights,
imitation, knowledge, learning, patents, technical change, trade, traps.
1 Introduction
Endogenous growth theory formalizes the role of technical progress in explaining modern
economic growth. Although this is a relatively recent development, many of its ideas
were already stressed by authors such as Kuznets, Griliches, Schmookler, Rosenberg and
Schumpeter. During the 1950s and 1960s, mainstream economics was dominated by the
one-sector neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), whose main fo-
cus was on capital accumulation. The model postulated the existence of an aggregate
production function featuring constant returns to scale and returns to each input falling
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1asymptotically to zero; given that some inputs cannot be accumulated, the model could
not generate sustained growth unless technology was assumed to improve exogenously.
This simple treatment of technology as exogenous was considered as unsatisfactory for
two main reasons: ﬁrst, by placing the source of sustained growth outside the model, the
theory could not explain the determinants of long-run economic performance and sec-
ond, empirical evidence pointed out that technical progress often depends on deliberate
economic decisions.
The ﬁrst attempts to endogenize the rate of technical change addressed the ﬁrst, but
not the second, problem. Assuming technical progress to be an unintentional by-product
of the introduction of new capital goods through a process named “learning-by-doing”,
Arrow (1962) was able to generate sustained growth at a rate that depended on invest-
ment decisions. Attempts at explicitly modeling investment in innovation faced another
diﬃculty. A replication argument suggests that, for a given state of technology, produc-
tion functions should exhibit constant returns to scale. If technical progress is considered
as an additional input, however, the technology features increasing returns to scale and
inputs cannot be paid their marginal product. Models of learning-by-doing avoided the
problem by assuming that increasing returns were external to ﬁrms, thereby preserving
perfect competition. However, this approach is not viable once investment in technol-
ogy is recognized as intentional. The solution was to follow the view of Schumpeter
(1942), that new technologies provide market power and that investment in innovation
is motivated by the prospect of future proﬁts. In this spirit, Shell (1973) studied the
case of a single monopolist investing in technical change and Nordhaus (1969a) wrote a
growth model with patents, monopoly power and many ﬁrms. In neither case did the
equilibrium feature sustained growth.1
A tractable model of imperfect competition under general equilibrium was not avail-
able until the analysis of monopolistic competition in consumption goods by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), later extended to diﬀerentiated inputs in production by Ethier (1982).
These models also showed how increasing returns could arise from an expansion in the
number of varieties of producer and consumer goods, an idea that is at the core of the
models studied in this Chapter. The ﬁrst dynamic models of economic growth with mo-
nopolistic competition and innovation motivated by proﬁts were built by Judd (1985)
and Grossman and Helpman (1989). Yet, these authors were interested in aspects other
than endogenous growth and none of their models featured long—run growth. Romer
(1987), who formalized an old idea of Young (1928), was the ﬁr s tt os h o wt h a tm o d e l s
of monopolistic competition could generate long-run growth through the increased spe-
cialization of labor across an increasing range of activities. The ﬁnal step was taken in
Romer (1990), which assumed that inventing new goods is a deliberate costly activity
and that monopoly proﬁts, granted to innovators by patents, motivate discoveries. Since
then, the basic model of endogenous growth with an expanding variety of products has
been extended in many direction.
The distinctive feature of the models discussed in this Chapter is “horizontal inno-
vation”: a discovery consists of the technical knowledge required to manufacture a new
1See Levhari and Sheshinski (1969) on necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of steady-
state growth in the presence of increasing returns to scale.
2good that does not displace existing ones. Therefore, innovation takes the form of an
expansion in the variety of available products. The underlying assumption is that the
availability of more goods, either for ﬁnal consumption or as intermediate inputs, raises
the material well-being of people. This can occur through various channels. Consumers
may value variety per se. For example, having a TV set and a Hi-Fi yields more utility
than having two units of any one of them. Productivity in manufacturing may increase
with the availability of a larger set of intermediate tools, such as hammers, trucks,
computers and so on. Similarly, specialization of labor across an increasing variety of
activities, as in the celebrated Adam Smith example of the pin factory, can make aggre-
gate production more eﬃcient. The main alternative approach is to model innovation as
quality improvements on a given array of products (“vertical innovation”), so that tech-
nical progress makes existing products obsolete. This process of “creative destruction”
was emphasized by Schumpeter and has been formalized in Aghion and Howitt (1992),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1991). The two approaches natu-
rally complement each other. The main advantage of models with horizontal innovation
lies in their analytical tractability, making them powerful tools for addressing a wide
range of questions. However, because of their simplistic view on the interaction between
innovators, these models are less suited to studying the eﬀects of competition between
“leaders” and “follower” on the growth process.
The ﬁrst section of this chapter describes a simpliﬁed version of Romer (1990) and
some extensions used in the literature. The model exhibits increasing returns to scale
and steady-state endogenous growth in output per capita and the stock of knowledge.
The key feature of the theory is the emphasis on investments in technical knowledge as
the determinant of long-run economic growth. Ideas and technological improvements
diﬀer from other physical assets, because they entail important public good elements.
Inventing new technology is typically costly, while reproducing ideas is relatively inex-
pensive. Therefore, technical knowledge is described as a non-rival good. Nevertheless,
ﬁrms are willing to invest in innovation because there exists a system of intellectual
property rights (patents) guaranteeing innovators monopoly power over the production
and sales of particular goods.
Growth models with an expanding variety of products are a natural dynamic coun-
terpart to trade models based on increasing returns and product diﬀerentiation. As
such, they oﬀer a simple framework for studying the eﬀects of market integration on
growth and other issues in dynamic trade theory. This is the subject of the second
section, which shows how trade integration can produce both static gains, by providing
access to foreign varieties, and dynamic gains, by raising the rate at which new goods
are introduced. Product-cycle trade and imitation are also considered.
In many instances, technical progress may be non-neutral towards diﬀerent factors
or sectors. This possibility is considered in the third section, where biased technical
change is incorporated in the basic growth model. By introducing several factors and
sectors, the economic incentives to develop technologies complementing a speciﬁcf a c -
tor, such as skilled workers, can be studied. These incentives critically depend on the
deﬁnition of property rights over the production of new ideas. The high variability in
the eﬀectiveness of patent laws across countries has important bearings on the form of
3technical progress. In particular, governments in less developed countries may have an
incentive not to enforce intellectual property rights in order to speed up the process of
technology adoption. However, the undesired side eﬀect of free-riding is that innovators
in industrialized countries lose incentives to create improvements that are most useful
in developing countries, but of limited application in industrialized markets.
Section four introduces complementarity in innovation. While innovation has no ef-
fect on the proﬁtability of existing intermediate ﬁrms in the benchmark model, in reality
new technologies can substitute or complement existing technologies. Innovation may
cause technological obsolescence of previous technologies, as emphasized by Schumpete-
rian models. In other cases, new technologies complement rather than substitute the
old ones. For instance, the market for a particular technology tends to be small at the
time of its introduction, but grows as new compatible applications are developed. This
complementarity in innovation can lead to multiple equilibria and poverty traps.
Complementarities in the growth process may also arise from ﬁnancial markets, as
suggested in section ﬁve. The progressive endogenous enrichment of asset markets,
associated with the development of new intermediate industries, may improve the diver-
siﬁcation opportunities available to investors. This, in turn, makes savers more prepared
to invest in high-productivity risky industries, thereby fostering further industrial and
ﬁnancial development. As a result, countries at early stages of development go through
periods of slow and highly volatile growth, eventually followed by a take-oﬀ with ﬁnancial
deepening and steady growth.
Finally, the last section of the Chapter shows how models with technological com-
plementarities can generate rich long-run dynamics, including endogenous ﬂuctuations
b e t w e e np e r i o d so fh i g ha n dl o wg r o w t h .C y c l e si ni n n o v a t i o na n dg r o w t hc a ne i t h e rb e
due to expectational indeterminacy, or the deterministic dynamics of two-sector models
with an endogenous market structure.
2 Growth with Expanding Variety
In this section, we present the benchmark model of endogenous growth with expanding
variety, and some extensions that will be developed in the following sections.
2.1 The Benchmark Model
The benchmark model is a simpliﬁed version of Romer (1990), where, for simplicity, we
abstract from investments in physical capital. The economy is populated by inﬁnitely
lived agents who derive utility from consumption and supply inelastic labor. The pop-











The representative household sets a consumption plan to maximize utility, subject to
an intertemporal budget constraint and a No-Ponzi game condition. The consumption






There is no physical capital, and savings are used to ﬁnance innovative investments.
The production side of the economy consists of two sectors of activity: a competitive
sector producing a homogenous ﬁnal good, and a non-competitive sector producing
diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The ﬁnal-good sector employs labor and a set of
intermediate goods as inputs. The technology for producing ﬁnal goods is represented









where xj is the quantity of the intermediate good j, At is the measure of intermediate
goods available at t, Ly is labor and α ∈ (0,1).T h i s s p e c i ﬁcation follows Spence
(1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982). It describes diﬀerent inputs as
imperfect substitutes, which symmetrically enter the production function, implying that
no intermediate good is intrinsically better or worse than any other, irrespective of the
time of introduction. The marginal product of each input is decreasing, and independent
of the measure of intermediate goods, At.
The intermediate good sector consists of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each
producing a diﬀerentiated variety j. Technology is symmetric across varieties: the pro-
duction of one unit of intermediate good requires one unit of ﬁnal good, assumed to be
the numeraire.2 In addition, each intermediate producer is subject to a sunk cost to
design a new intermediate input variety. New designs are produced instantaneously and
with no uncertainty. The innovating ﬁrm can patent the design, and acquire a perpetual
monopoly power over the production of the corresponding input.
In the absence of intellectual property rights, free-riding would prevent any innovative
activity. If ﬁrms could costlessly copy the design, competition would drive ex-post rents
to zero. Then, no ﬁrms would have an incentive, ex-ante, to pay a sunk cost to design
a new input.
The research activity only uses labor. An important assumption is that innovation
generates an intertemporal externality. In particular, the design of a (unit measure of)
new intermediate good requires a labor input equal to 1/(δAt). The assumption that
labor productivity increases with the stock of knowledge, At, can be rationalized by
the idea of researchers beneﬁtting from accessing the stock of applications for patents,
thereby obtaining inspiration for new designs.
The law of motion of technical knowledge can be written as:
.
At = δAtLx,t (4)
2In Romer (1990), the variable input is physical capital, and the economy has two state variables,
i.e., physical capital and knowledge.
5where δ is a parameter and Lx denotes the aggregate employment in research. The rate
of technological change is a linear function of total employment in research.3 Finally,
feasibility requires that L ≥ Lx,t + Ly,t.
First, we characterize the equilibrium in the ﬁnal good sector. Let w denote the
wage, and pj be the price of the j’th variety of intermediate input. The price of the ﬁnal
product is the numeraire. The representative ﬁrm in the competitive ﬁnal sector takes


















α−1 ∀j ∈ [0,A t] (6)
and







Next, consider the problem of intermediate producers. A ﬁrm owning a patent sets
its production level so as to maximize the proﬁt, subject to the demand function (6).
The proﬁto ft h eﬁrm producing the j-th variety is πj,t = pj,txj,t − xj,t.T h e o p t i m a l
quantity and price set by the monopolist are:
xj,t = xt = α
2
1−αLy,t and pj,t = p =1 /α, (8)
respectively. Hence, the maximum proﬁt for an intermediate producer is:






Substitution of xt into (7) yields the equilibrium wage as:
wt =( 1− α)α
2α
1−αAt. (10)
Next, we guess-and-verify the existence of a balanced growth (BG) equilibrium, such
that consumption, production and technical knowledge grow at the same constant rate,
γ, and the two sectors employ constant proportions of the workforce.4 In BG, both the







where γA ≤ 1 is a positive externality through the stock of knowledge and γL is a negative externality
that can be interpreted as coming from the duplication of research eﬀort. Assuming γA < 1 leads to
qualitative diﬀerences in the prediction of the model. In particular, the speciﬁcation where γA =1and
γL =0 , which is the model discussed here, generates scale eﬀects. See further discussion later in this
chapter and, especially, in chapter ... of this Handbook.
4The equilibrium that we characterized can be proved to be unique. Moreover, the version of Romer’s
model described here features no transitional dynamics, as in AK models (Rebelo, 1991).
6production and the proﬁts of intermediate ﬁrms, as given by equations (8) and (9), are
constant over time and across industries. Thus, xt = x and πt = π.
Free entry implies that the present discounted value (PDV) of proﬁts from innovation
cannot exceed the entry cost. By the Euler equation, (2), the interest rate is also constant
i nB G .H e n c e ,t h eP D Vo fp r o ﬁts equals π/r. The entry cost is given by the wage paid






















The right hand-side expression is the marginal cost of innovation, independent of At,
due to the cancellation of two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, labor productivity and,
hence, the equilibrium wage grow linearly with At. On the other hand, the productivity
of researchers increases with At, due to the intertemporal knowledge spillover. Thus,
the unit cost of innovation is constant over time. Note that, without the externality, the
cost of innovation would grow over time, and technical progress and growth would come
to a halt, like in the neoclassical model.
For innovation to be positive, (12) must hold with equality. We can use (i) the
resource constraint, implying that Ly = L−Lx and (ii) the fact that, from (4) and BG,
Lx = γ/δ, to express (12) as a relationship between the interest rate and the growth
rate:
r = α(δL− γ). (13)
(13) describes the equilibrium condition on the production side of the economy: the
higher is the interest rate that ﬁrms must pay to ﬁnance innovation expenditure, the
lower is employment in research and growth.
Finally, the consumption Euler equation, (2), given BG, yields:
r = ρ + θγ, (14)
which is the usual positive relation between interest rate and growth. Figure 1 plots the
linear equations (13) and (14), which characterize the equilibrium. The two equations
correspond, respectively, to the DD (demand for funds) and SS (supply of savings) linear
schedules.
FIGURE 1
7An interior solution exists if and only if αδL > ρ. When this condition fails to be
satisﬁed, all workers are employed in the production of consumption goods. When it is





showing that the growth rate is increasing in the productivity of the research sector
(δ), the size of the labor force (L) and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption (1/θ), while it is decreasing in the elasticity of ﬁnal output to labor, (1−α),
and the discount rate.
The trade-oﬀ between ﬁnal production (consumption), on the one hand, and inno-
vation and growth, on the other hand, can be shown by substituting the equilibrium





1−α (L − γ/δ)At. (16)
The decentralized equilibrium is ineﬃcient for two reasons:5
1. Intermediate ﬁrms exert monopoly power, and charge a price in excess of the
marginal cost of production. This leads to an underproduction of each variety of
intermediate goods.
2. the accumulation of ideas produces externalities not internalized in the laissez-faire
economy. Innovating ﬁrms compare the private cost of innovation, wt/(δAt),w i t h
the present discounted value of proﬁts, π/r. However, they ignore the spillover on
the future productivity of innovation.
Contrary to Schumpeterian models, innovation does not cause “creative destruc-
tion”, i.e., no rent is reduced by the entry of new ﬁrms. As a result, growth is always
suboptimally low in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Policies aimed at increasing research
activities (e.g., through subsidies to R&D or intermediate production) are both growth-
and welfare-enhancing. This result is not robust, however. Benassy (1998) shows that
in a model where the return to specialization is allowed to vary and does not depend
on ﬁrms’ market power (α), research and growth in the laissez-faire equilibrium may be
suboptimally too high.
2.2 Two Variations of the Benchmark Model: ‘‘Lab-Equipment’’ and
‘‘Labor-for Intermediates’’
We now consider two alternative speciﬁc a t i o n so ft h em o d e lt h a th a v eb e e nu s e di nt h e
literature, and that will be discussed in the following sections. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation
5There is an additional reason why, in general, models with a Dixit-Stiglitz technology can generate
ineﬃcient allocations in laissez-faire, namely that the range of intermediate goods produced is endoge-
nous. The standard assumption of complete markets is violated in Dixit-Stiglitz models, because there
is no market price for the goods not produced. This issue is discussed in Matsuyama (1995, 1997). A
dynamic example of such a failure is provided by the model of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), which is
discussed in detail in section 6.
8is the so-called “lab-equipment” model, where the research activity uses ﬁnal output
instead of labor as a productive input.6 More formally, equation (4) is replaced by the
condition
.
At = Yx/µ,w h e r eYx denotes the units of ﬁnal output devoted to research
(hence, consumption is C = Y −Ax−Yx)a n dµ the output cost per unit of innovation.
In the lab-equipment model, there is no research spillover of the type discussed in the
benchmark model. Labor is entirely allocated to ﬁnal production (Ly = L), and the


















Sustained growth is attained by allocating a constant share of production to ﬁnance the
research activity.
The second speciﬁcation assumes that labor is not used in ﬁnal production, but is
used (instead of ﬁnal output) as the unique input in the intermediate goods production.7








where Z is a ﬁxed factor (e.g., land) that is typically normalized to unity and ignored.
In this model, 1/At units of labor are required to produce one unit of any intermediate
input, with constant marginal costs. Therefore, in this version of the model, innovation
generates a spillover on the productivity of both research and intermediate production.8
We refer to this version as the “labor-for-intermediates” model.
It immediately follows that, in equilibrium, the production of each intermediate ﬁrm
equals x = L−Lx. The price of intermediates is once more a mark-up over the marginal
cost, pt = wt/(αAt). In a BG equilibrium, wages and technology grow at the same rate,









ω (L − Lx).
6The “lab-equipment” model was ﬁrst introduced by Romer and Rivera Batiz (1991a); see also Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
7We follow the speciﬁcation used by Young (1993). A related approach, treating the variety of inputs
as consumption goods produced with labor, is examined in Grossman and Helpman (1991).
8The spillover on the productivity of intermediate production is not necessary to have endogenous
growth. Without it, an equilibrium can be found in which production of each intermediate falls as A
grows: γA = −γx . In this case, employment in production, Ax, is constant and the growth rate of Y
is (1 − α)γA.
9The free entry condition can be expressed as:
1 − α
rα

















Clearly, both the “lab-equipment” and “labor-for-intermediates” model yield solutions
qualitatively similar to that of the benchmark model.
2.3 Limited Patent Protection
In this section, we discuss the eﬀects of limited patent protection. For simplicity, we
focus on the lab-equipment version discussed in the previous section. The expectation
of monopoly proﬁts provides the basic incentive motivating investment in innovation;
at the same time, monopoly rights introduce a distortion in the economy that raises
prices above marginal costs and causes the underprovision of goods. Since the growth
rate of knowledge in the typical decentralized equilibrium is below the social optimum,
t h ep r e s e n c eo fm o n o p o l yp o w e rp o s e sat r a d e - o ﬀ between dynamic and static eﬃciency,
leading to the question, ﬁrst studied by Nordhaus (1969), of whether there exists an
optimal level of protection of monopoly rights. In the basic model, we assumed the
monopoly power of innovators to last forever. Now, we study how the main results
change when agents cannot be perfectly excluded from using advances discovered by
others. A tractable way of doing this is to assume monopoly power to be eroded at a
constant rate, so that in every instant, a fraction m of the monopolized goods becomes
competitive.9 Then, for a given range of varieties in the economy, At,t h en u m b e ro f
“imitated” intermediates that have become competitive, A∗




t = m(At − A
∗
t). (19)
Stronger patent protection can be considered as a reduction in the imitation rate m.N o t e
that the model now has two state variables, At and A∗
t, and will exhibit transitional
dynamics. In general, from any starting point, the ratio A∗











Once a product is imitated, the monopoly power of the original producer is lost and
its prices is driven down to the marginal cost by competition. Thus, at each point in
9A growth model with limited patent life is developed by Judd (1985). Here, we follow Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995). An alternative way of introducing limited patent protection is to assume





10This can be seen imposing
·
A∗/A∗ = γ in (19).
10time, intermediates still produced by monopolists are sold as before at the markup price
1/α, while for the others, the competitive price is one. Substituting prices into demand
functions yields the quantity of each intermediate sold in equilibrium:
xj = α
1/(1−α)L ≡ x




2/(1−α)L ≡ x for j ∈ (A
∗
t,A t).
Note that x∗ >x , because the monopolized goods have a higher price.
Free entry requires the PDV of proﬁts generated by an innovation, V , to equal its cost
µ. Along the balanced growth path, where the interest rate is constant, arbitrage in asset
markets requires the instantaneous return to innovation, π/µ,t oe q u a lt h er e a li n t e r e s t
rate adjusted for imitation risk: r+m.11 Since prices and quantities of the monopolized
goods are identical to those in the basic model, π is not aﬀected by imitation. Imitation
only aﬀects the duration of the proﬁt ﬂow, which is reﬂected in the eﬀective interest
rate. Therefore, limiting patent lives introduces a new ineﬃciency: although the beneﬁt
from a discovery is permanent for the economy, the reward for the innovator is now only
temporary. Using the Euler equation for consumption growth, γ =( r − ρ)/θ,a n dt h e









− m − ρ
¸
.
As expected, the growth rate is decreasing in the imitation rate, as the limited duration of
the monopoly eﬀectively reduces the private value of an innovation. If we were concerned
about long-run growth only, it would then be clear that patents should always be fully
and eternally protected. However, for a given level of technology, At, output is higher
the shorter is the patent duration (higher m), as can be seen by substituting equilibrium















Therefore, a reduction in the patent life entails a trade-oﬀ between an immediate con-
sumption gain and future losses in terms of lower growth, and its quantitative analysis
requires the calculation of welfare along the transition. Kwan and Lai (2003) perform
such an analysis, both numerically and by linearizing the BG equilibrium in the neigh-
borhood of the steady-state, and show the existence of an optimum patent life. They
11A simple way of seeing this is through the following argument. In a time interval dt,t h eﬁrm
provides a proﬁts t r e a mπ · dt,ac a p i t a lg a i no f
·
V · dt if not imitated and a capital loss V if imitated
( a st h ev a l u eo ft h ep a t e n tw o u l dd r o pt oz e r o ) .I nt h el i m i tdt → 0, the probability of being imitated
in this time interval is m · dt and the probability of not being imitated equals (1 − m · dt). Therefore,
the expected return for the ﬁrm is π · dt +( 1− m · dt)
·
V · dt − mV · dt. Selling the ﬁrm and investing
the proceeds in the capital market would yield an interest payment of rV · dt. Arbitrage implies that
the returns from these two forms of investment should be equal and in a steady state
·
V =0 ,i m p l y i n g
π/V = r + m.
11also provide a simple calibration, using US data on long-run growth, markups and plau-
sible values for ρ and θ, to suggest that over-protection of patents is unlikely to happen,
whereas the welfare cost of under-protection can be substantial.
Alternatively, the optimal patent length can be analytically derived in models with a
simpler structure. For example, Grossman and Lai (2004) construct a modiﬁed version
of the model described above, where they assume quasi-linear functions. They show
the optimal patent length to be an increasing function of the useful life of a product, of
consumers’ patience and the ratio of consumers’ and producers’ surplus under monopoly
to consumers’ surplus under competition. In addition, they derive the optimal patent
length for noncooperative trading countries and ﬁnd that advanced economies with a
higher innovative potential will, in general, grant longer patents. A similar point is made
in Lai and Qin (2003).
3T r a d e , G r o w t h a n d I m i t a t i o n
Growth models with an expanding variety of products are a natural dynamic counterpart
to the widely-used trade models based on increasing returns and product diﬀerentiation
developed in the 1980s (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985). As such, they oﬀer a simple
framework for studying the eﬀects of market integration on growth and other issues in
dynamic trade theory. Quality-ladder models have also been proposed in this literature,
but they are a less natural counterpart to the static new trade theory, as they do not
f o c u so nt h en u m b e ro fv a r i e t i e sa v a i l a b l ei na ne c o n o m ya n dt h e i rg r o w t hr a t e .A sw e
shall see, economic integration can provide both static gains, through the access to a
wider range of goods, and dynamic gains, through an increase in the rate at which new
varieties are introduced. However, the results may vary when integration is limited to
commodity markets with no international diﬀusion of knowledge (Romer and Rivera-
Batiz, 1991a) and when countries diﬀer in their initial stock of knowledge (Devereux
and Lapham, 1994).
Finally, the analysis in this section is extended to product-cycle trade: the intro-
duction of new products in advanced countries and their subsequent imitation by less
developed countries. An important result will be to show that, contrary to the closed
economy case, imitation by less developed countries may spur innovation and growth
(Helpman, 1993).
3.1 Scale Effects, Economic Integration and Trade
In this section, we use the benchmark model to discuss the eﬀects of trade and integra-
tion. The model features scale eﬀects. Take two identical countries with identical labor
endowment, L = L∗. In isolation, both countries would grow at the same rate, as given
by (15). But if they merge, the growth rate of the integrated country increases to:
γ
I =






Therefore, the model predicts that economic integration boosts growth.
Integration, even if beneﬁcial, may be diﬃcult to achieve. However, in many in-
stances, trade operates as a substitute for economic integration. Romer and Rivera-
12Batiz (1991a) analyze under which condition trade would attain the same beneﬁts as
economic integration. To this aim, they consider two experiments:12
1. The economies can trade at no cost in goods and assets, but knowledge spillovers
remain localized within national borders;
2. In addition, knowledge spillovers work across borders after trade.
In both cases, to simplify the analysis, the two economies are assumed to produce,
before trade, disjoint subsets of intermediate goods. This assumptions avoids compli-
cations arising from trade turning monopolies into duopolies in those industries which
exist in both countries. Clearly, after trade, there would be no incentive for overlap
in innovation, and the importance of inputs that were historically produced in both
countries would decline to zero over time.
We start from the case analyzed by Romer and Rivera-Batiz (1991a), where the two
countries are perfectly identical before trade. Namely, L = L∗ and A0 = A∗
0,w h e r e
the star denotes the foreign economy, and time zero denotes the moment when trade
starts. Since, in a BG equilibrium, γ = δLx, trade can only aﬀect growth via the split
of the workforce between production and research. Such a split, however, is not aﬀected
by trade, for in the symmetric equilibrium, trade increases by the same proportion
the productivity of workers in production and the proﬁtability of research. Since both
the cost and private beneﬁt of innovation increase by the same factor, investments in
innovation remain unchanged.
More formally, the after trade wage is:





which is twice as large as in the pre-trade equilibrium since at the moment of trade
liberalization, A = A∗. Higher labor costs are a disincentive to research. But trade also
increases the market for intermediate goods. Each monopolist can now sell its product
in two markets. Since the demand elasticity is the same in both markets, the monopoly
price equals 1/α in both markets. Thus, the after trade proﬁti s




















which, after simplifying, is identical to (12). Therefore, the split of the workforce between
production and research remains unchanged, and trade has no permanent eﬀects on
growth. Opening up to free trade, however, induces a once-and-for-all gain: both output
12The original article considers two versions of the model, one using the benchmark set-up and the
other using the ”lab-equipment” version. For the sake of brevity, we restrict the attention to the ﬁrst.
Romer (1994) extends the analysis to the case when a tariﬀ on imports is imposed.
13and consumption increase in both countries, similarly to an unexpected increase in
the stock of knowledge, since ﬁnal producers in both countries can use a larger set of
intermediate goods.
This result is not robust to asymmetric initial conditions. Devereux and Lapham
(1994) show that if, initially, the two countries have diﬀerent productivity levels, trade
leads to specialization and a rise in the world growth rate.13 Consider the economies
described above, but assume that A0 <A ∗








where V, V ∗ denote the PDV of proﬁts for an intermediate ﬁrm located at home and
abroad, respectively. First, trade in intermediate goods and free capital markets equalize
t h er a t eo fr e t u r nt ob o t hﬁnancial assets (r)a n dl a b o r( w).14 Second, monopoly proﬁts
are independent of ﬁrms’ locations, thereby implying that the value of ﬁrms must be the
same all over the world: V = V ∗ = V w. Therefore, at the time of trade liberalization,






implying that no innovation is carried out in equilibrium in the (home) country, starting
from a lower productivity. Moreover, the productivity gap in R&D widens over time:
indeed, trade forever eliminates the incentives to innovate in the initially poorer country.
In the richer (foreign) country, however, trade boosts innovation.15 The value of
foreign ﬁrms must satisfy the following Bellman equation:
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Since knowledge only accumulates in the foreign country, the value of intermediate ﬁrms
must decline over time, and in the long-run tend to its pre-trade value, i.e., V ∗ =
(1 − α)α
2α
















13See also Romer and Rivera-Batiz (1991b) on the eﬀects of trade restrictions with asymmetric
countries.
14Recall equation (22). The equalization of wages descends from a particular feature of the equilib-
rium, i.e., that the marginal product of labor is independent of the level of employment in production
(since x is linear in Ly). This feature is not robust. If the production technology had land as an input,
for instance, wages would not be equalized across countries; see Devereux and Lapham (1994) for an
analysis of the more general case.
15Our discussion focuses on a world where no economy becomes fully specialized in research, since
this seems to be the empirically plausible case.
14Comparing (24) with (12) shows that trade reduces employment in production and, con-
sequently, increases the long-run research activity in the foreign country, which implies
that trade increases growth. In terms of ﬁgure 1, trade creates an outward shift in the
DD schedule, leading to a higher interest rate and faster growth in equilibrium.
The result can be interpreted as trade leading to specialization. The home country
specializes in ﬁnal production, while the foreign country diversiﬁes between manufactur-
ing and innovation.16 This is eﬃcient, since there are country-wide economies of scale
in innovation. Although trade leads to zero innovation in the home country, markets
are integrated: ﬁnal good producers, in both countries, can use the same varieties of
intermediates and all consumers in the world can invest in the innovative ﬁrms of the
foreign economy. Therefore, the location of innovation and ﬁrms has no impact on the
relative welfare of the two countries.
Consider now the case when trade induces cross-country ﬂows of ideas, i.e., if the
knowledge spillover is determined, after trade, by the world stock of ideas contained in
the union of A and A∗. When free trade is allowed, the accumulation of knowledge in
each country is given by:
˙ A = δLx(A + A





Even if trade did not aﬀect the allocation of the workforce between production and
research, the rate of growth of technology would increase. But there is an additional
eﬀect; the larger knowledge spillover increases labor productivity in research, inducing
an increase of employment in research. Formally, the total eﬀect is equivalent to an
increase in parameter δ.I nt e r m so fﬁgure 1, trade in goods plus ﬂow of ideas imply an
upward shift of the DD locus for both countries. Hence, trade attains the same eﬀect as
economic integration (increasing δ is equivalent to increasing L). This result is robust
to asymmetric initial conditions.
3.2 Innovation, Imitation and Product Cycles
The model just presented may be appropriate for describing trade integration between
similar countries, but it misses important features of North-South trade. In a seminal
article, Vernon (1966) argued that new products are ﬁrst introduced in rich countries (the
North), where R&D capabilities are high and the proximity to large and rich markets
facilitates innovation. After some time, when a product reaches a stage of maturity and
manufacturing methods become standardized, the good can easily be imitated and then,
the bulk of production moves to less developed countries (the South), to take advantage
of low wages. The expanding variety model provides a natural framework for studying
the introduction of new goods and their subsequent imitation (product cycle trade).17
We have already discussed imitation within the context of a closed economy. Here, we
extend the analysis to the case where a richer North innovates, while a poorer South only
16Home-country patent holders will still produce intermediates, but as compared to the world’s stock
of intermediates, they will be of measure zero.
17Quality ladder models of innovation have been used to study product-cycles by, among others,
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Segerstom et al. (1991) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2003).
15engages in imitation. The analysis yields new results that modify some of the previous
conclusions on the eﬀect of imitation on innovation. The key questions are, ﬁrst, how the
transfer of production to the South through imitation aﬀects the incentives to innovate
and, second, how it aﬀects the income distribution between North and South.
Following Helpman (1993), consider a two-region model of innovation, imitation and
trade. Assume that R&D, producing new goods, is performed in the North only and
that costless imitation takes place in the South at a constant rate m.18 The imitation
rate can be interpreted as an inverse measure of protection of Intellectual Property
Rights (IPRs). Once a good is copied in the South, it is produced by competitive ﬁrms.
Therefore, at every point in time, there is a range AN
t of goods produced by monopolists
in the North and a range AS
t of goods that have been copied and are produced in the
South by competitive ﬁrms. Given that the rate of introduction of new good is γ =
·
At/At,
where At = AN
t +AS





t , it follows that a steady-state where the ratio AN
t /AS














We use the “labor-for-intermediates” version of the growth model, so that the price
of a single variety depends on the prevailing wage rate in the country where it is man-
ufactured. This is an important feature of product cycle models, allowing the North to
beneﬁt from low production costs in the South for imitated goods. Therefore, we deﬁne






where At is the (growing) range of available products xi and   =1 /(1 − α) is the
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. Intermediates are manufactured
with 1/At units of labor per unit of output in both regions. Northern ﬁrms charge a
monopoly price, as long as their products have not been imitated, equal to a constant
markup 1/α over the production cost, given by the wage rate. On the contrary, Southern
ﬁrms produce imitated goods that have become competitive and sell them at a price equal
















t are the prices of any variety of intermediates produced in the North
and South, respectively.
As in the benchmark model, innovation requires labor: the introduction of new
products per unit of time
·
At equals δAtLx,w h e r eLx is the (Northern) labor input
employed in R&D, δ is a productivity parameter and At captures an externality from
18The rate of imitation is made endogenous in Grossman and Helpman (1991b).
16past innovations. This implies that the growth rate of the economy is a linear function
of the number of workers employed in R&D, γ = Lxδ.A s u s u a l , p r o ﬁts generated by
the monopoly over the sale of the new good are used to cover the cost of innovation.
Since the proﬁts per product are a fraction (1 − α) of total revenue pNx and the labor
market clears, AN
















Arbitrage in asset markets implies that (r + m)V N = πN +
·
V N,w h e r eV N is the PDV
of a new good and the eﬀective interest rate is adjusted by the imitation risk. Along a
BG path,
·
V N =0and free entry ensures that the value of an innovation equals its cost,
wN






¢ γ + m
γ
= r + m. (29)
Together with the Euler equation for consumption growth, (29) provides an implicit
solution for the long-run growth rate of innovation. Note that the left-hand side is the
proﬁt rate (i.e., instantaneous proﬁts over the value of the innovation) and the right-hand
side represents the eﬀective cost of capital, inclusive of the imitation risk.
To see the eﬀect of a tightening of IPRs (a reduction of m), consider how an inﬁnites-
imal change in m aﬀects the two sides of (29). Taking a log linear approximation, the
impact of m on the proﬁtr a t ei s1/(γ + m),w h e r e a st h ee ﬀect on the cost of capital is
1/(r + m). In the case of log preferences, studied by Helpman (1993), r>γ . Hence, a
reduction of m has a larger impact on the proﬁt rate than on the eﬀective cost of capital,
thereby reducing the proﬁtability of innovation and growth. What is the eﬀect on the












it becomes apparent that a reduction of m increases the share of goods manufactured in
the North, both through its direct eﬀect and by reducing γ and r.
To understand these results, note that stronger IPRs have two opposite eﬀects. First,
a lower imitation rate prolongs the expected duration of the monopoly on a new product
developed in the North, thereby increasing the returns to innovation. Second, since
ﬁrms produce for a longer time in the North, it rises the demand for Northern labor,
wN, and hence, the cost of innovation. For the speciﬁcation with log utility, the latter
eﬀect dominates and innovation declines. More generally, the link between the rate
of imitation and innovation can go either way (as in Grossman and Helpman, 1991a).
However, the important result here is that tighter IPRs does not necessarily stimulate
innovation in the long run.
The eﬀect of IPRs on the North-South wage ratio can be found using (27), together










Given that a decline in the imitation rate m raises
¡
AN/AS¢
/(LN − γ/δ) (see equation
(30)), a tightening of IPRs raises the relative wage of the North. Helpman (1993) com-
putes welfare changes in the North and in the South (including transitional dynamics)
after a change in the imitation rate m, and concludes that the South is unambiguously
hurt by a decline in imitation. Moreover, if the imitation rate is not too high, the North
can also be worse-oﬀ.
More recent papers on product cycles, incorporating the notion that stronger IPRs
make relocation of production to the South a more attractive option, have come to dif-
ferent conclusions. For example, by assuming that Northern multinationals can produce
in the South and that Southern ﬁrms can only imitate after production has been trans-
ferred to their country, Lai (1998) shows that stronger IPRs increase the rate of product
innovation and the relative wage of the South. Similarly, Yang and Maskus (2001) ﬁnd
that if Northern ﬁrms can licence their technology to Southern producers, being subject
to an imitation risk, stronger IPRs reduce the cost of licensing, free resources for R&D
and foster growth, with ambiguous eﬀects on relative wages. Finally, the literature on
appropriate technology (e.g., Diwan and Rodrik, 1991, Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001,
Gancia, 2003) has shown that, when the North and the South have diﬀerent technolog-
ical needs, the South has an incentive to protect IPRs in order to attract innovations
more suited to their technological needs. Some of these results are discussed in the next
sections.
4 Directed Technical Change
So far, technical progress has been modeled as an increase in total factor productivity
(A)t h a ti sn e u t r a lt o w a r d sd i ﬀerent factors and sectors. For many applications, however,
this assumption is not realistic. For example, there is evidence that technical progress
has been skill-biased during the last century and that this bias accelerated during the
1980s. Similarly, the fact that the output shares of labor and capital have been roughly
constant in the US while the capital-labor ratio has been steadily increasing suggests
that technical change has mainly been labor-augmenting.20 Further, industry studies
show R&D intensity to vary substantially across sectors. In order to build a theory
for the direction of technical change, a ﬁrst step is to introduce more sectors into the








Using xN = ALN
y /AN, xS = ALS
y/AS and the pricing formula (27) yields the expression in the text.
20Unless the production function is Cobb-Douglas, in which case the direction of technical progress
is irrelevant. Empirical estimates suggest that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital
is likely to be less than one. See Hamermesh (1993) for a survey of early estimates and Krusell et al.
(2000) and Antras (2003) for more recent contributions.
18model. Then, studying the economic incentives to develop technologies complementing
as p e c i ﬁc factor or sector can help understand what determines the shape of technology.
An important contribution of this new theory will be to shed light on the determi-
nants of wage inequality (Acemoglu, 1998, 2003a). Another application studies under
which circumstances technologies developed by proﬁt-motivated ﬁrms are appropriate
for the economic conditions of the countries where they are used. The analysis will
demonstrate that, since IPRs are weakly protected in developing countries, new tech-
nologies tend to be designed for the markets and needs of advanced countries. As a
result, these technologies yield a low level of productivity when adopted by developing
countries (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). Trade can reinforce this problem and create
interesting general equilibrium eﬀects.
Although most of the results discussed in this section can be derived using models of
vertical innovation, the expanding variety approach has proven to be particularly suited
for addressing these issues because of its analytical tractability and simple dynamics.
For instance, creative destruction, a fundamental feature of quality-ladder models, is
not a crucial element for the problems at hand, and abstracting from it substantially
simpliﬁes the analysis.
4.1 Factor-Biased Innovation and Wage Inequality
Directed technical change was formalized by Acemoglu (1998), and then integrated by
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) into a model of growth with expanding variety, to explain
the degree of skill-complementarity of technology.21 In this section, we discuss the
expanding variety version (following the synthesis of Acemoglu, 2002) by extending the
“lab-equipment” model to two sectors employing skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.










where YL and YH are goods produced with unskilled labor, L, and skilled labor, H,r e -
spectively. Y represents aggregate output, used for both consumption and investment,
as a combination of the two goods produced in the economy, with an elasticity of sub-
stitution equal to  . Maximizing Y under a resource constraint gives constant elasticity










where PL and PH are the prices of YL and YH, respectively. Aggregate output is chosen






¢1/(1− ) =1 . (34)
The distinctive feature of this model is that the two goods are now produced using














where xL,j, j ∈ [0,A L], are intermediate goods complementing unskilled labor, whereas
xH,j, j ∈ [0,A H] complement skilled labor. This assumption captures the fact that
diﬀerent factors usually operate with diﬀerent technologies and that a new technology
may beneﬁt one factor more than others.22 For example, it has been argued that com-
puters boosted the productivity of skilled more than that of unskilled labor, whereas
the opposite occurred after the introduction of the assembly line. As before, technical
progress takes the form of an increase in the number of intermediate goods, [AL,A H],
but now an innovator must decide which technology to expand. The proﬁtability of the
two sectors pins down, endogenously, the direction of technical change. In a steady-state
equilibrium, there is a constant ratio of the number of intermediates used by each factor,
AH/AL, and this can be interpreted as the extent of the “endogenous skill-bias” of the
technology.
The analysis follows the same steps as in model with a single factor. Final good
producers take the price of their output (PL,P H,), the price of intermediates (pL,j,p H,j)
and wages (wL,w H) as given. Consider a variety j used in the production of YL.P r o ﬁt








and an equivalent expression for xH,j.
The intermediate good sector is monopolistic, with each producer owning the patent
for a single variety. The cost of producing one unit of any intermediate good is one unit
of the numeraire. The symmetric structure of demand and technology implies that all
monopolists set the same price, pLj = pL. In particular, given the isoelastic demand,
they set pL =1 /α and sell the quantity xL,j =( α2PL)
1
1−α L. The proﬁt ﬂow accruing to
intermediate producers can therefore be expressed as





Similar conclusions are reached for varieties used in the production of YH, leading to
















22The analysis can be generalized to speciﬁcations where, in the spirit of Heckscher-Ohlin models,
each sector uses all productive factors, but factor intensities diﬀer across sectors. The model can also
be generalized to more than two factors and sectors.
20which, since proﬁts are used to ﬁnance innovation, is also the relative proﬁtability of
R&D directed to the two sectors. The ﬁrst term in (39) represents the “price eﬀect”:
there is a greater incentive to invent technologies producing more expensive goods.23
The second term is the “market size” eﬀect: the incentive to develop a new technology
is proportional to the number of workers that will be using it.24












Note the similarity with (16). As in the benchmark model, output - in each sector - is a
linear function of technology and labor. But sectoral output now also depends on sectoral
prices, PL and PH, since a higher price of output increases the value of productivity of
intermediates, but not their costs, and therefore encourages ﬁrms to use more of them,
thereby raising labor productivity. Note that this is not the case in the one-sector model
since there, the price of output is proportional to the price of intermediates.
We can now solve for prices and wages as functions of the state of technology and
endowments. Using (40) into (33) and noting that the wage bill is a constant fraction






















where σ ≡ 1+( 1− α)(  − 1) is, by deﬁnition, the elasticity of substitution between H
and L.25 Note that the skill premium, wH/wL, is decreasing in the relative supply of
skilled labor (H/L) and increasing in the skill-bias (AH/AL).
The ﬁnal step is to ﬁnd the equilibrium for technology. We assume, as in the lab-
equipment model of section 2.2, that the development of a new intermediate good to
require a ﬁxed cost of µ units of the numeraire. Free entry and an arbitrage condition
require the value Vz of an innovation directed to factor Z ∈ {L,H} to equal its cost.
Since the value of an innovation is the PDV of the inﬁnite stream of proﬁts it generates,
an equilibrium with a positive rate of innovation in both types of intermediates such that
the ratio AH/AL remains constant, i.e. a BG path where PH/PL, wH/wL and πH/πL are
also constant, requires proﬁt equalization in the two sectors, πH = πL = π.I m p o s i n g
23The price eﬀect, restated in terms of factor prices, was emphasized by Hicks (1932) and Habakkuk
(1962).
24Market size, although in the context of industry- and ﬁrm-level innovation, was emphasized as a de-
terminant of technical progress by Griliches and Schmookler (1963), Schmookler (1966) and Schumpeter
(1950).
25This is the short-run elasticity of substitution between L and H, for a given technology AL and
AH.









Equation (43) shows that, as long as workers of diﬀerent skill levels are gross substitutes
(σ>1), an increase in the supply of one factor will induce more innovation directed
to that speciﬁc factor. This is the case because, with σ>1,t h em a r k e ts i z ee ﬀect
dominates the price eﬀect, and technology is biased towards the abundant factor. The
opposite is true if σ<1. As usual, the growth rate of the economy can be found from
the free-entry condition πZ/r = µ, Z ∈ {L,H}. Using (34), (41) and (43) to substitute















If we only had one factor (e.g., H =0 ) ,t h eg r o w t hr a t ew o u l dr e d u c et ot h a to ft h e
benchmark model.










Equation (44) shows that the slope of the labor demand curve, i.e., the relationship
between relative wages and relative labor supply, can be either positive or negative and
is the result of two opposite forces. On the one hand, a large supply of one factor
depresses the price of its product while, on the other hand, it induces a technology bias
in its favor, thereby raising its productivity. A high substitutability between H and
L implies a weak price eﬀect of an increase in relative supply, which makes a positive
relationship more likely. In particular, if σ>2, the market size eﬀect is suﬃciently
strong to not only dominate the price eﬀect on technical change (see equation 43), but
also the substitution eﬀect between skilled and unskilled workers at a given technology.
This result can help rationalize several facts. First, it suggests that technical change
has been skill biased during the past 60 years, because of the steady growth in the
supply of skilled labor. Second, the case σ>2 oﬀers an explanation for the fall and rise
in the US skill premium during the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, there was a large
increase in the supply of skilled labor (H/L). Assuming this shock to be unexpected, the
model predicts an initial fall in the skill premium (recall that AH/AL is a state variable
that does not immediately adjust), followed by its rise due to the induced skill biased
technical change, a pattern broadly consistent with the evidence.
In Acemoglu (2003b), this set-up is used to study the direction of technical progress
when the two factors of production are capital and labor. Beyond the change of no-
tation, the resulting model has an important qualitative diﬀerence, as capital can be
accumulated. The main ﬁnding is that, when both capital and labor augmenting inno-
vations are allowed, a balanced growth path still exists and features labor-augmenting
22technical progress only. The intuition is that, while there are two ways of increas-
ing the production of capital-intensive goods (capital-augmenting technical change and
accumulation), there is only one way of increasing the production of labor-intensive
goods (labor-augmenting technical progress). Therefore, in the presence of capital accu-
mulation, technical progress must be more labor-augmenting than capital-augmenting.
Further, Acemoglu shows that, if capital and labor are gross complements (i.e., the elas-
ticity of substitution between the two is less than one), which seems to be the empirically
relevant case (see, for example, Antras, 2004), the economy converges to the balanced
growth path.
Finally, the theory of directed technical change can be used to study which industries
attract more innovation and why R&D intensity diﬀers across sectors. In this exercise,
following a modiﬁed version of Klenow (1996), we abstract from factor endowments as
determinants of technology, by assuming there to be a single primary input, which we call
labor. Instead, other characteristics can make one sector more proﬁtable than others.
Major explanations put forward in the literature on innovation are industry diﬀerences
in technological opportunities, market size and appropriability of rents, all factors that
can easily be embedded in the basic model with two sectors. In particular, to capture
the market size hypothesis, we introduce a parameter η deﬁning the relative importance










Diﬀerences in technological opportunities can be incorporated by allowing the cost of an
innovation, µi, to vary across sectors. Finally, we assume that an inventor in industry i
can only extract a fraction λi of the proﬁts generated by his innovation. The previous
analysis carries over almost unchanged, with the main diﬀerence that we now need
to solve for the allocation of labor across industries. This can be done requiring all









Solving the new arbitrage condition stating that innovation for the two industries should















As expected, industries with a larger market size, better technological opportunities
and higher appropriability attract more innovations.26 Empirical estimates surveyed
by Cohen and Levin (1989) suggest that about one half of the industry diﬀerences in
research intensity can be attributed to the available measures of these three factors.
26This is true as long as σ<2. This restriction is required to have balanced growth. If violated, e.g.
if goods are highly substitutable, it would be proﬁtable to direct innovation to one sector only.
234.2 Appropriate Technology and Development
Directed technical change has interesting implications for the analysis of some devel-
opment issues. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) show that technologies resulting from
directed technical change are optimal for the economic conditions of the markets where
they are sold. They analyze the implications of this ﬁnding in a two-country world
where technological innovation takes place in the North, and the South does not enforce
(or imperfectly enforce) IPRs. In this environment, innovators in the North can only
extract rents from selling technologies (embodied in new varieties of intermediate goods)
in the Northern market, since new technologies can be copied and locally produced in
the South. Thus, innovation does not respond to the factor endowment of the South:
the equilibrium skill-bias of technical change (see equation (43) in the previous section)
is determined by the factor endowment of the North only. In this sense, technological
development tends to be “inappropriate” for the South: there is too much investment
in inventing new technologies augmenting the productivity of skilled workers, and too
little in inventing new technologies augmenting the productivity of unskilled workers.
Such excessive skill-bias prevents the South from fully proﬁting from technological im-
provements. The theory can explain North-South productivity diﬀerences, even when
the technology is identical and there are no signiﬁcant barriers to technology adoption.27
We start by studying the set of advanced countries, called North. A continuum of
measure one of ﬁnal goods is produced by competitive ﬁrms. Final goods, indexed by





the numeraire. There are two diﬀerences with respect to the model of the previous
section: ﬁrst, there is a continuum of sectors, not just two, and second, the elasticity of
substitution between sectors is unity.28 Each good i can be produced with both skilled
and unskilled labor using two sets of intermediate goods: intermediates [0,A L] used by
unskilled workers only and intermediates [0,A H] used by skilled workers only. Therefore,
despite the continuum of sectors, there are only two types of technologies, as in the basic
model of directed technical change. The production function takes the following form:













where li and hi are the quantities of unskilled and skilled labor employed in sector i,
respectively, and xz,v,i i st h eq u a n t i t yo fi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o do ft y p ev used in sector
i together with the labor of skill level z = L,H. Note that sectors diﬀer in labor-
augmenting productivity parameters, (1 − i) for the unskilled technology and i for the
skilled technology, so that unskilled labor has a comparative advantage in sectors with
a low index. Producers of good i take the price of their product, Pi, the price of
27Evidence on cross-country TFP diﬀerences is provided by, among others, Klenow and Rodriguez
(1997), Hall and Jones (1998), Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1997) and Prescott (1998). The view
that technological diﬀerences arise from barriers to technology adoption is expressed by, among others,
Parente and Prescott (1994) and Prescott (1998).
28The composite output Y can be interpreted as a symmetric Cobb Douglas over the measure of ﬁnal
goods i ∈ [0,1].
24intermediates (pL,v,p H,v) and wages (wL,w H) as given. Proﬁt maximization gives the
following demands for intermediates:
xL,v,i =( 1− i)li [αPi/pL,v]
1/(1−α) and xH,v,i = ihi[αPi/pH,v]
1/(1−α) . (46)
The intermediate good sector is monopolistic. Each producer holds the patent for a
single type of intermediate good v, and sells its output to ﬁrms in the ﬁnal good sectors.
The cost of producing one unit of any intermediate is conveniently normalized to α2
units of the numeraire. Proﬁt maximization by monopolists implies that prices are a
constant markup over marginal costs, p = α. Using the price of intermediates together
with (46) and (45) gives the ﬁnal output of sector i as a linear function of the number
of intermediate goods and labor:
yi = P
α/(1−α)
i [AL (1 − i)li + AHihi]. (47)
>From (47), it is easily seen that all sectors whose index i is below a threshold level
J will use the unskilled technology only and the remaining sectors will employ the
skilled technology only. This happens because of the comparative advantage of unskilled
workers in low index sectors and the linearity of the production function (there is no
incentive to combine the two technologies and, for a given i, one always dominates the
other). The total proﬁts earned by monopolists are:












Note that, by symmetry, πL,v = πL,j and πH,v = πH,j. Given the Cobb-Douglas spec-
iﬁcation in (45), the wage bill in each sector is a fraction (1 − α) of sectoral output.
Therefore, equation (47) can be used to ﬁnd wages:29
wL =( 1− α)Pi
1/(1−α)AL(1 − i) and wH =( 1− α)Pi
1/(1−α)AHi. (49)
Deﬁning PL ≡ P0, PH ≡ P1 and dividing equations in (49) by their counterparts in
sectors 0 and 1, respectively, it is possible to derive the following pattern of prices: for
i ≤ J, Pi = PL (1 − i)
−(1−α) and for i ≥ J, Pi = PHi−(1−α). Intuitively, the price of a
good produced with skilled (unskilled) labor is decreasing in the sectoral productivity of
skilled (unskilled) workers. Next, note that to maximize Y , expenditures across goods
must be equalized, i.e., Piyi = PHy1 = PLy0 (as for a symmetric Cobb-Douglas). This
observation, plus the given pattern of prices and full employment, imply that labor is
evenly distributed among sectors: li = L/J, hi = H/(1 − J),a sp r i c e sa n ds e c t o r a l
productivity compensate each other. Finally, in sector i = J,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
both technologies are equally proﬁtable or PL(1 − J)
−(1−α) = PHJ−(1−α);t h i sc o n d i t i o n ,
















29In Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), there is an additional parameter (Z>1), which is here omitted
for simplicity, which augments the productivity of skilled workers, ensuring that the skill premium is
positive in equilibrium.
25The higher the relative endowment of skill (H/L) and the skill-bias of technology
(AH/AL), the larger the fraction of sectors using the skill-intensive technology (1 − J).
Finally, integrating Piyi over [0,1], using (47), (50) and the fact that the consumption




=1 ) gives a simple representation for
aggregate output:







w h i c hi saC E Sf u n c t i o no ft e c h n o l o g ya n de n d o w m e n t s ,w i t ha ne l a s t i c i t yo fs u b s t i t u t i o n
between factors equal to two.
So far, the analysis deﬁnes an equilibrium for a given technology. Next, we need to
study innovation and characterize the equilibrium skill-bias of technology, (AH/AL). As
before, technical progress takes the form of an increase in AL and AH and is the result
of directed R&D investment. The cost of an innovation (of any type) is equal to µ units
of the numeraire, and R&D is proﬁt a b l ea sl o n ga st h eP D Vo ft h ei n ﬁnite ﬂow of proﬁts
that a producer of a new intermediate expects to earn covers the ﬁxed cost of innovation.
Finally, free entry ensures that there are no additional proﬁts. Using the price pattern,
instantaneous proﬁts can be simpliﬁed as:
πH = α(1 − α)P
1/(1−α)
H H. (52)
A parallel expression gives πL. Balanced growth requires πL = πH;i nt h i sc a s e ,AH and
AL grow at the same rate, the ratio AH/AL is constant as are J, PL and PH.I m p o s i n g










Note that the equilibrium skill-bias is identical to that of (43) in the special case when
σ =2 . Further, (53) shows that the higher is the skill endowment of a country, the larger
is the range of sectors using the skilled technology. This is a complete characterization
of the equilibrium for fully integrated economies developing and selling technologies in
their markets with full protection of IPRs and can be interpreted as a description of the
collection of rich countries, here called the North.
Consider now Southern economies, where skilled labor is assumed to be relatively
more scarce: HS/LS <H N/LN. Assume that intellectual property rights are not en-
forced in the South and that there is no North-South trade. It follows that intermediate
producers located in the North cannot sell their goods or copyrights to ﬁrms located
in the South, so that the relevant market for technologies is the Northern market only.
Nonetheless, Southern producers can copy Northern innovations at a small but positive
cost. As a consequence, no two ﬁrms in the South ﬁnd it proﬁtable to copy the same
innovation and all intermediates introduced in the North are immediately copied (pro-
vided that the imitation cost is suﬃciently small) and sold to Southern producers by a
local monopolist. Under these assumptions, ﬁrms in the South take the technologies de-
veloped originating in the North as given and do not invest in innovation.30 This means
30Imitation can be explicitly modelled as an activity similar to innovation, but less costly. Assuming
t h ec o s to fa ni n n o v a t i o no ft y p ez to decrease with the distance from the relevant technology frontier
AN
Z , as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), would yield very similar results.
26that both the North and the South use the same technologies, but AH/AL = HN/LN,
i.e., the skill-bias is determined by the factor endowment of the North, since this is the
only market for new technologies. Except for this, the other equilibrium conditions also
apply to the South after substituting the new endowments, HS and LS.
We are now ready to answer the following questions: are technologies appropriate
for the skill endowment of the countries where they are developed? What happens to
aggregate productivity if they are used in a diﬀerent economic environment?
Simple diﬀerentiation on (51) establishes that Y is maximized for AH/AL = H/L.
This is exactly condition (53), showing that the equilibrium skill-bias is optimally chosen
for the Northern skill composition. On the contrary, since factor abundance in the South
does not aﬀect the direction of technical change, new technologies developed in the North
are inappropriate for the needs of the South. As a consequence, output per capita,
Y/(L + H) i sg r e a t e ri nt h eN o r t ht h a ni nt h eS o u t h .T h er e a s o nf o rt h e s ep r o d u c t i v i t y
diﬀerences is a technology-skill mismatch. To understand why, note that, from equation
(50), JS >J N. Rewriting (53) as AHJN = AL
¡
1 − JN¢
and inspecting equation (47)
reveals that unskilled workers are employed in the North up to sector JN,w h e r et h e y
become as productive as skilled workers. This basic eﬃciency condition is violated in
the South, where AHJS >A L
¡
1 − JS¢
. Because of its smaller skill endowment, the
South is using low-skill workers in some sectors where high-skill workers would be more
productive.
This result can help understand the existence of substantial diﬀerences in TFP across
countries, even when the technology is common. In particular, Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001) compare the predictive power of their model in explaining cross-country output
diﬀerences with that of a comparable neoclassical model, where all countries have access
to the same technologies and output is Cobb-Douglas in labor, human and physical capi-
tal. Their computations suggest that the proposed mechanism can account for one-third
to one half of the total factor productivity gap between the United States and develop-
ing countries. Predictions on the pattern of North-South, cross-industry, productivity
diﬀerences are also tested. Since the South uses the same technology [AL,A H] as the
rest of the world, but it has a higher relative price for skill-intensive goods, it follows
that the value of productivity in LDCs relative to that of the North should be higher in
skill-intensive sectors. The empirical analysis supports this prediction.
The view that countries adopt diﬀerent technologies out of a world “menu”, and that
the choice of the appropriate technology depends on factor endowments, particularly
on the average skill of the labor force, ﬁnds support in the analysis of Caselli and
Coleman (2000). However, these authors also ﬁnd that many poor countries choose
technologies inside the world technology frontier, thereby suggesting that barriers to
technology adoption may also be important to explain the low total factor productivity
of these countries.
4.3 Trade, Inequality and Appropriate Technology
We have seen that directed technical change can help understand inequality, both within
and between countries. Several authors have stressed that international trade is another
important determinant of income distribution. For example, Wood (1994) argues that
27the higher competition with imports from LDCs may be responsible for the deterioration
in relative wages of low-skill workers in the US in the past decades. Further, there is
a widespread concern that globalization may be accompanied by a widening of income
diﬀerences between rich and poor countries. Although the analysis of these issues goes
beyond the scope of this paper, we want to argue that R&D-driven endogenous growth
models can fruitfully be used to understand some of the links between trade and inequal-
ity. In particular, we now show that trade with LDCs can have a profound impact on
income distribution, beyond what is suggested by static trade theory, through its eﬀect
on the direction of technical change. By changing the relative prices and the location
of production, international trade can change the incentives for developing innovations
targeted at speciﬁc factors or sectors, systematically beneﬁtting certain groups or coun-
tries more than others. A key assumption in deriving these results is that, as in the
previous paragraph, LDCs do not provide an adequate protection of IPRs.
First, consider the eﬀect of trade in the benchmark model of directed technical
change. The analysis follows Acemoglu (2002, 2003a). Recall that the proﬁtability
of an innovation depends on its market size and the price of the goods it produces, as in
equation (39). What happens to technology if we allow free trade in YL and YH between
a skill-abundant North and a skill-scarce South? The market size for innovations does
not change, because inventors continue to sell their machines in the North only. But
trade, at ﬁrst, will increases the relative price of skill-intensive goods in the North. To
see this, note that trade generates a single world market with a relative price depending
on the world supply of goods. Since skills are scarcer in the world economy than in the
North alone, trade will increase the relative price of skill-intensive goods in the North
(the opposite will happen in the South). In particular, world prices are now given by











This change in prices, for a given technology, makes skill-complement innovations more
proﬁtable and accelerates the creation of skill-complementary machines. Since, along
the BG path, both types of innovations must be equally proﬁtable and hence πH = πL,
equation (39) shows that this process continues until the relative price of goods has
returned to the pre-trade level in the North. Substituting equation (54) in (39) and











Given that HN/LN >H W/LW, the new technology is more skill-biased and skilled
w o r k e r si nt h eN o r t he a r nh i g h e rw a g e s .T h ee ﬀect on the skill premium can be seen by














28The eﬀect of a move from autarky to free trade can be approximated by the elasticity
of the skill premium to a change in LW/HW computed at LW/HW = LN/HN (that is,
starting from the pre-trade equilibrium). Equation (56) shows this elasticity to be unity.
Thus, if, for example, LW/HW were 4% higher than LN/HN, the model would predict
trade to raise the skill premium by the same 4%.31
Without technical change, instead, the reaction of the skill premium to a change in
the perceived scarcity of factors due to trade depends on the degree of substitutability
of skilled and unskilled workers. From equation (42), the elasticity of the skill premium
to a change in L/H would be 1/σ, less than in the case of endogenous technology as
long as σ>1, i.e., when skilled and unskilled workers are gross substitutes. Therefore,
with directed technical change and σ>1, trade increases the skill premium in the North
by more than would otherwise be the case: for example, if the elasticity of substitution
is 2, the endogenous reaction of technical progress doubles the impact of trade on wage
inequality.
Note that another direct channel through which trade can aﬀect factor prices in
models of endogenous technical change is by aﬀecting the reward to innovation. If trade
increases the reward to innovation (for example, through the scale eﬀect) and the R&D
sector is skill-intensive relative to the rest of the economy, trade will naturally spur
wage inequality. This mechanism is studied by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) in a
quality-ladder growth model with no scale eﬀects.32
What are the implications of trade opening for cross-country income diﬀerences?
We have seen that trade induces a higher skill bias in technology; given the result
of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) that the excessive skill-complementarity of Northern
technologies is a cause of low productivity in Souther countries, it may seem natural
to conclude that trade would then increase productivity diﬀerences. However, this con-
clusion would be premature. In the absence of any barriers, trade equalizes the price
of goods; given that the production functions adopted so far rule out complete special-
ization, this immediately implies that factor prices and sectoral productivity are also
equalized. This does not mean that trade equalizes income levels; because of their dif-
ferent skill-composition, the North and the South will still have diﬀerences in income
per capita, but nothing general can be said.33
The fact that trade generates productivity convergence crucially depends on factor
prices being equalized by trade. Since factor price equalization is a poor approximation
of reality, it is worth exploring the implications of models with endogenous technologies
31Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) show that 4% is a plausible estimate of the increase in the unskilled
labor content of US trade with LDCs between 1980 and 1995. Therefore, this simple exercise may give
a sense of how much of the roughly 20% increase in the US skill premium in the same period can be
attributed to trade.
32Recently, other papers have suggested that trade between identical countries may as well increase
skill premia through its eﬀect on technology. See, for example, Epifani and Gancia (2002), Neary (2003)
and Thoenig and Verdier (2003).
33A general result is that the endogenous response of technology makes trade less beneﬁcial for LDCs
than would otherwise be the case. This occurs because, after trade opening, the skill premium rises as a
result of the induced skill-biased technical change. Given that the North is more skilled-labor abundant,
it proportionally beneﬁts more from a higher skill premium.
29when this property does not hold. A simple way of doing this is to add Ricardian pro-
ductivity diﬀerences, so that trade opening leads to complete specialization. In this case,
the endogenous response of technology to weak IPRs in LDCs becomes a force promot-
ing productivity divergence.34 Further, trade with countries providing weak protection
for IPRs may have an adverse eﬀect on the growth rate of the world economy. These
results, shown by Gancia (2003), can be obtained by modifying Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001) as follows. First, we allow the elasticity of substitution between ﬁnal goods to





, with  >1.T h e n ,w ea s s u m et h a te a c h
good yi can be produced by competitive ﬁrms both in the North and the South, using




























There are three important diﬀerences with respect to (45). First, (1 − i) and i now
capture Ricardian productivity diﬀerences between the North and South, implying that
the North is relatively more productive in high index sectors. Second, intermediate goods
are sector speciﬁc, not factor speciﬁc (there is now a continuum [0,1] of technologies, not
only two). Third, there is only one type of labor. Given that the endogenous component
of technology (Ai) is still assumed to be common across countries, the sectoral North-
South productivity ratio only depends on the Ricardian elements. The new implication is
that countries specialize completely under free trade, as each good is only manufactured
in the location where it can be produced at a lower cost.
The equilibrium can be represented by the intersection of two curves, as in Dornbusch
et. al. (1977). For any relative wage, the ﬁrst curve gives the range [0,J] of goods
eﬃciently produced in the South: J
1−J = wN
wS . The second curve combines trade balance
and a BG research arbitrage condition, requiring proﬁts to be equalized across sectors
and countries. To ﬁnd this, the model assumes that the owner of a patent can only
extract a fraction λ<1 of the proﬁts generated by its innovation in the South, so that
λ can be interpreted as an index of the strength of international IPRs protection. The








J (i)e σ/(1−e σ)di
R J
0 (1 − i)e σ/(1−e σ)di
#1−e σ
, (58)
with e σ ≡ (1 − α)(  − 1) ∈ (0,1).35 As long as e σ>0 (i.e.,  >1), the wage gap is
decreasing in the degree of protection of IPRs in the South, λ. The reason is that
weaker protection of IPRs shifts innovations out of Southern sectors and increases the
relative productivity of the North. From the condition J
1−J = wN
wS , it is easily seen
34The idea that trade may magnify cross-country inequality was put forward by several economists.
Some examples are Stiglitz (1970), Young (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995), Matsuyama (1996),
Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Ventura (1997).
35e σ<1 guarantees balanced growth across sectors. e σ>0, i.e., an elasticity of substitution between
goods greater than one, rules out immiserizing growth.
30that a weaker protection of IPRs in the South, by raising wN/wS, is accompanied by a
reduction in sectors [1 − J] located in the North, because higher wages make the North
less competitive. A second result emerges by calculating the growth rate of the world
economy. In particular, Gancia (2003) shows the growth rate of the world economy to
fall with λ and approach zero if λ is suﬃciently low. The reason is that a lower λ shifts
innovation towards Northern sectors and, at the same time, induces the relocation of
more sectors to the South, where production costs become lower. This, in turn, implies
that a wider range of goods becomes subject to weak IPRs and hence, to a low innovation
incentive.
5 Complementarity in Innovation
In the models described so far, innovation has no eﬀect on the proﬁtability of existing
intermediate ﬁrms. This is a knife-edge property which descends from the speciﬁcation of
the ﬁnal production technology, (3). In general, however, new technologies can substitute
or complement existing technologies.
Innovation often causes technological obsolescence of previous technologies. Substi-
tution is emphasized, in an extreme fashion, by Schumpeterian models such as Aghion
and Howitt (1992). In such models, innovation provides “better of the same”, i.e., more
eﬃcient versions of the pre-existing inputs. Growth is led by a process of creative de-
struction, whereby innovations do not only generate but also destroy rents over time.
This has interesting implications for dynamics: the expectation of future innovations
discourages current innovation, since today’s innovators expect a short life of their rents
due to rapid obsolescence. More generally, substitution causes a decline in the value
of intermediate ﬁrms over time, at a speed depending on the rate of innovation in the
economy.
There are instances, however, where new technologies complement rather than sub-
stitute old technologies. The market for a particular technology is often small at the
moment of its ﬁrst introduction. This limits the cash-ﬂow of innovating ﬁrms, which
initially pose little threat to more established technologies. However, the development
of new compatible applications expands the market for successful new technologies over
time, thereby increasing the proﬁts earned by their producers. Rosenberg (1976) dis-
cusses a number of historical examples, where such complementarities were important.
A classical example is the steam engine. This had been invented in the early part of
the XVIIIth Century, but its diﬀusion remained very sporadic before a number of com-
plementary innovations (e.g., Watt’s separate condenser) made it competitive with the
waterwheels, which remained widespread until late in the XIXth Century.
Complementarity in innovation raises interesting issues concerning the enforcement
and design of intellectual property rights. For instance, what division of the surplus be-
tween basic and secondary innovation maximizes social welfare? This issue is addressed
by Scotchmer and Green (1995) who construct a model where innovations are sequen-
tially introduced, and the proﬁts of major innovators can be undermined by subsequent
derivative innovations. In this case, the threat of derivative innovations can reduce the
incentive for ﬁrms to invest in major improvements in the ﬁrst place. However, too
strong a defense of the property right of basic innovators may reduce the incentive to
31invest in socially valuable derivative innovations. Scotchmer and Green (1995) show
that the optimal policy in fact consists of a combination of ﬁnite breath and length of
patents. Scotchmer (1996) instead argues that it may be optimal to deny patentability
to derivative innovations, instead allowing derivative innovations to be developed under
licensing agreements with the owner of the basic technology. More recently, Bessen and
Maskin (2002) show that when there is suﬃcient complementarity between innovations
(as in the case of the software industry), weak patent laws may be conducive to more
innovation than strong patent laws. The reason is that while the incumbent’s current
proﬁt is increased by strong patent laws, its prospect of developing future proﬁtable
innovation is reduced when patent laws inhibit complementary innovations.
While this literature focuses on the partial equilibrium analysis of single industries,
complementarity in innovation also has implications on broader development questions.
Multiple equilibria originating from coordination failures (of the type emphasized, in
diﬀerent contexts, by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989, and Cooper and John, 1988)
can arise when there is complementarity in innovation. Countries can get locked-in into
an equilibrium with no technology adoption, and temporary big-push policies targeting
incentives to adopt new technologies may turn out to be useful.36 One such example is
Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996). In their model, multiple equilibria and poverty traps
may arise from the two-way causality between the market size of each intermediate good
and their variety: when the availability of intermediates is limited, ﬁnal good producers
are forced to use a labor intensive technology which, in turn, reduces the incentive to
introduce new intermediates.
Young (1993) constructs a model where innovation expands the variety of both in-
termediate and ﬁnal goods. New intermediate inputs are not used by mature ﬁnal in-
dustries, and their market is initially thin. The expansion of the market for technologies
over time creates complementarity in innovation. The details of this model are dis-
cussed in the remainder of this section. To this aim, we augment the benchmark model
of section 2 with the endogenous expansion in the variety of ﬁnal goods.37 Over time,
innovative investments make new intermediate inputs available to ﬁnal producers, as in
Romer’s model. However, as a by-product (spillover), they also generate an equivalent
expansion of the set of ﬁnal goods that can be produced. There are no property rights
deﬁned on the production of new ﬁnal goods, and these are produced by competitive
ﬁrms extraneous to the innovation process.
At will now denote the measure of both ﬁnal goods and intermediate goods available
in the economy at t. Final products are imperfect substitutes in consumption, and the
36Interestingly, in models with complementarity in innovation, market economies may be stuck in
no-growth traps that are ineﬃcient in the sense that the optimal intertemporal allocation would require
positive investment and growth. See, for example, Ciccone and Matsuyama (1999).
37Models featuring an expanding variety of ﬁnal products include Judd (1985), Grossman and Help-
man (1989, chapter 3) and, more recently, Xie (1998) and Funke and Strulik (2000). Here, we follow
Young (1993) which, in turn, is close to Judd’s paper.











This speciﬁcation implies that consumers’ needs grow as new goods become available.
Suppose, for instance, that a measure ε of new goods is introduced between time t
and t + j.A t t i m e t, consumers are satisﬁed with not consuming the varieties yet to
be invented. However, at time t + j, the same consumers’ utility would fall to minus
inﬁnity if they did not consume the new goods.










where Θ ≥ 1 is a parameter. Note that labor is not used in the ﬁnal goods production.
First, to build the intuition in the simplest case, we maintain that all ﬁnal goods are
produced with the same technology employing all available varieties of intermediate
inputs. More formally, we characterize the equilibrium in the limit case where Θ →∞ ,
so that min[sΘ,A]=A. This assumption will be relaxed later.
We use the “labor-for-intermediates” model introduced in section 2.2, where labor
is used for research and intermediate production and the productivity of labor in inter-
mediate production equals At. We choose the nominal wage as the numeraire.39 Hence,












Note that proﬁts fall over time at the rate at which knowledge grows. In a BG equi-



















38This is the benchmark speciﬁcation in Young (1993), where it is then extended to general CES
preferences across goods. The logarithmic speciﬁcation is analytically convenient because of the property
that consumers spend an equal income share on all existing goods.
39Note that we cannot simply set the price of the ﬁnal good as the numeraire, as there is an increasing
variety of ﬁnal goods.
33The intertemporal optimality condition for consumption also diﬀers from the bench-








In a BG equilibrium, the total expenditure on consumption goods is constant. Hence,
r = ρ − γ. (62)
This expression can be substituted into (61) to give a unique solution for γ.A sl o n ga s





which is almost identical to (15), except for the constant term α/(1 − α) being replaced
by 1/α. In the limit case considered so far (Θ →∞ ), the model is isomorphic to Romer
(1990).
N e x t ,w em o v et ot h eg e n e r a lc a s ew h e r eΘ ≥ 1 is ﬁn i t e .T h i si m p l i e st h a tﬁnal pro-
ducers cannot use the entire range of intermediate goods. In particular, an intermediate
good indexed by s cannot be used by “mature” ﬁnal industries having an index j,s u c h
that j<s / Θ. This assumption captures the idea that a technology mismatch develops
over time between mature ﬁnal good industries and new technologies.41
An important implication of this assumption is that, when introduced, a new technol-
ogy (intermediate input) is only required by a limited number of ﬁnal industries. Thus,
the monopolist producing a new variety has a small cash-ﬂow. This is especially true
when the parameter Θ is small: as Θ → 1, there is no demand for a new intermediate
g o o da tt h et i m eo fi t sﬁrst appearance. However, the market for technologies expands
over time, as new ﬁnal goods using “modern” technologies appear. This dynamic market
size eﬀect generates complementarity in the innovation process. An innovator is eager to
see rapid technical progress, as this expands the number of users of the new technology.
Countering this eﬀect, there is a process of “expenditure diversion” that reduces,
ceteris paribus, the demand for each intermediate good. Over time, technical progress
expands the number of intermediate inputs over which ﬁnal producers spread their de-
mand. As noted above, the total expenditure on ﬁnal goods is constant in a BG equi-
librium. Since ﬁnal good ﬁrms make zero proﬁts at all times, and intermediates are
the only inputs, the total expenditure on the intermediate goods must also be constant.
Therefore, an increase in A dilutes the expenditure over a larger mass of intermediate
goods, and reduces the proﬁto fe a c he x i s t i n gi n t e r m e d i a t eﬁrm. This eﬀect generates
substitution rather than complementarity in innovation.
The dynamic market size eﬀect may dominate for young intermediate ﬁrms. But as
a technology becomes more mature, the expenditure dilution eﬀect takes over. Thus,
40See Young, 1993, p. 783 for the derivation of this Euler equation.
41In principle, it would seem natural to assume that new ﬁnal goods do not use very old intermediate
goods. Young (1993, p.780) argues that allowing for this possibility would not change the main results,
but would make the analysis more involved.
34ﬁrms can go through a life-cycle: their proﬁt ﬂow increases over time at an earlier stage
and decreases at a later stage.
We denote by π(Aτ,A t) the proﬁt realized at time τ by an intermediate producer
who entered the market in period t<τ .Solving the proﬁt maximization problem for












It is easily veriﬁed that as Θ →∞ , the solution becomes identical to (60), where nominal
proﬁts fall at the same rate as At.
Free-entry implies: Z ∞
t
e




Solving the integral on the left-hand side, using the Euler condition, r + γ = ρ,a n d




(δL− γ)(γ + ρ(Θ − 1)) ≤ 1, (65)
where all terms but γ are parameters. For suﬃciently large values of Θ, i.e., when the
market for new technology is large, f0
FE(γ) < 0 and the equilibrium is unique. However,
if Θ < 1+δL/ρ, fFE(γ) is non-monotonic, and multiple equilibria are possible.
FIGURE 2
Figure 2 describes the three possible cases. As long as ρ>γ , which is a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the interest rate to be positive, fFE(γ) is increasing in Θ.
For a range of small Θ0s, there is no equilibrium with positive innovation (lower curve).
The only equilibrium is a point such as X’, featuring zero growth.
For an intermediate range of Θ,w eh a v efFE(γ)=1in correspondence of two
values of γ (intermediate curve). This implies that (for generic economies), there exist
three equilibria, where equilibria such as point X feature zero innovation and growth.
Firms contemplating entry expect no expansion of the market size for new technologies.
Furthermore, such market size is too small to warrant proﬁtable deviations, and the
e x p e c t a t i o no fn oi n n o v a t i o ni sf u l ﬁlled in equilibrium. Equilibria such as point Y are
characterized by local complementarity in innovation: the expectation of higher future
innovation and growth increases the value of new ﬁrms, stimulating current entry and
35innovation. In steady-state (BG), this implies a positive slope of the locus fFE(γ).42
Eventually, for suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hg r o w t hr a t e s ,t h ed i v e r s i o ne ﬀect dominates. Thus, in
an equilibrium like Z, the value of innovating ﬁrms depends negatively on the speed of
innovation.43
Finally, for a range of large Θ’s, substitution dominates throughout (upper curve).
The initial market for new technologies is suﬃciently large to make the expenditure di-
version eﬀect dominate the market size eﬀect, even at low growth rates. The equilibrium
is unique, and the solution is isomorphic to that of the benchmark model of expanding
variety.
6 Financial Development
A natural way in which the expansion of the variety of industries can generate comple-
m e n t a r i t i e si nt h eg r o w t hp r o c e s si st h r o u g hi t se ﬀects on ﬁnancial markets. Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997) construct a model where the introduction of new securities, associ-
ated with the development of new intermediate industries, improves the diversiﬁcation
opportunities available to investors. Investors react by supplying more funds, which fos-
ters further industrial and ﬁnancial development, generating a feedback.44 The model
oﬀers a theory of development. At early stages of development, a limited number of in-
termediate industries are active (due to technological nonconvexities), which limits the
degree of risk-spreading that the economy can achieve. To avoid highly risky investments,
agents choose inferior but safer technologies. The inability to diversify idiosyncratic risks
introduces a large amount of uncertainty in the growth process. In equilibrium, devel-
opment proceeds in stages. First, there is a period of “primitive accumulation” with a
highly variable output, followed by take-oﬀ and ﬁnancial deepening and ﬁnally, steady
growth. Multiple equilibria and poverty traps are possible in a generalized version of
the model.
The theory can explain why the growth process is both slow and highly volatile at
early stages of development, and stabilizes as an economy grows richer. Evidence of
this pattern can be found in the accounts of pre-industrial growth given by a number of
historians, such as Braudel (1979), North and Thomas (1973) and DeVries (1990). For
instance, in cities such as Florence, Genoa and Amsterdam, prolonged periods of pros-
perity and growth have come to an end after episodes of ﬁnancial crises. Interestingly,
these large set-backs were not followed (as a neoclassical growth model would instead
42As mentioned above, ﬁrms go through a life-cycle here. When a new technology is introduced, the
proﬁt ﬂow of an innovating ﬁrm is small. As time goes by, the expenditure diversion eﬀect becomes
relatively more important. The value of a ﬁrm upon entry is the PDV of its proﬁts t r e a m . L o c a l
complementarity occurs if, for a particular γ,p r o ﬁts increase at a suﬃciently steep rate in the earlier
part of the ﬁrm’s life-cycle.
43If the expectational stability of the equilibria in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) is tested,
equilibria such as point Y are not found to be E-stable, while equilibria such as X and Z are stable.
See the discussion in section 7.2.
44This paper is part of a recent literature on the two-way relationship between ﬁnancial development
and growth. This includes Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Zilibotti
(1994). In none of these other papers does ﬁnancial development take the form of an expansion in the
“variety” of assets.
36predict) by a fast recovery but, rather, by long periods of stagnation. Similar phenom-
ena are observed in the contemporary world. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) document
robust evidence of increases in GDP per capita being associated with large decreases in
the volatility of the growth process. It has also been documented that higher volatility
in GDP is associated with lower growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995).
We here describe a simpliﬁed version of the model. Time is discrete. The economy
is populated by overlapping generations of two-period lived households. The population
is constant, and each cohort has a unit mass (L =1 ). There is uncertainty in the
economy, which we represent by a continuum of equally likely states s ∈ [0,1]. Agents
are assumed to consume only in the second period of their lives.45 Their preferences are








T h ep r o d u c t i o ns i d eo ft h ee c o n o m yc o n s i s t so fau n i q u eﬁnal good sector, and
a continuum of intermediate industries. The ﬁnal good sector uses intermediate inputs
and labor to produce ﬁnal output. Output in state s is given by the following production
function:
Ys,t =( xs,t−1 + xΦ,s,t−1)
α L
1−α. (67)
The term in brackets is “capital”, and it is either produced by a continuum of inter-
mediate industries, each producing some state-contingent amount of output (xs), or a
separate sector using a “safe technology” (xΦ). The measure of the industries with a
state-contingent production, At, is determined in equilibrium, and At can expand over
time, like in Romer’s model, but it can also fall. Moreover, At ∈ [0,1], i.e., the set of
inputs is bounded.
In their youth, agents work in the ﬁnal sector and earn a competitive wage, ws,t =
(1 − α)Ys,t. At the end of this period, they take portfolio decisions: they can place their
savings in a set of risky securities ({Fi}i∈[0,At]), consisting of state-contingent claims to
the output of the intermediate industries or, in a safe asset (φ), consisting of claims
to the output of the safe technology. After the investment decisions, the uncertainty
unravels, the security yields its return and the amount of capital brought forward to
the next period is determined. The capital is then sold to ﬁnal sector ﬁrms and fully
depreciates after use. Old agents consume their capital income and die.
Intermediate industries use ﬁnal output for production. An intermediate industry
i ∈ [0,A t] is assumed to produce a positive output only if state s = i occurs. In all
other states of nature, the ﬁrm is not productive. Moreover, the i-th industry is only
productive if it uses a minimum amount of ﬁnal output, Mi, where








with x ∈ (0,1). This implies that some intermediate industries require a certain mini-
mum size, Mi, before being productive. In particular, industries i ≤ x have no minimum
45This is for simplicity. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) assume that agents consume in both periods.
It is also possible to study the case of a general CRRA utility function.
37size requirement, and for the rest of the industries, the minimum size requirement in-
creases linearly with the index i.




RFi if i = s and Fi ≥ Mi
0 otherwise .
Since there are no start-up costs, all markets are competitive. Thus, ﬁrms retain no
proﬁts, and the product is entirely distributed to the holders of the securities. The
j0th security entitles its owner to a claim to R units of capital in state j (as long as
the minimum size constraint is satisﬁed, which is always the case in equilibrium), and
otherwise to nothing. Savings invested in the “safe technology” give the return
xΦ,s = rφ, ∀s ∈ [0,1],
where r<R .Thus, one unit of the safe asset is a claim to r units of capital in all states
of nature.
Since the risky securities yield symmetric returns, and there is safety in numbers, it
is optimal for risk-averse agents to hold a portfolio containing all available securities in
equal amounts. More formally, the optimal portfolio decision features Fi = F, for all
i ∈ [0,A t]. We refer to this portfolio consisting of an equal amount of all traded risky
securities as a balanced portfolio.
If At =1 , a balanced portfolio of risky securities bears no risk, and ﬁrst-order domi-
nates the safe investment. However, due to the presence of technological non-convexities
(minimum size requirements), not all industries are in general activated. When At < 1,
the inferior technology is safer, and there is a trade-oﬀ between risk and productivity.














φt + AtFt ≤ wt. (69)
ρ˜ s,t+1 denotes the rate of return of capital, which is taken as parametric by agents,
and does not aﬀect the solution of the program.46 Agents also take At, i.e., the set of
securities oﬀered, as parametric.
46In equilibrium:





ρG,t+1applies in the “good state”, i.e., when the realized state is i ≤ At, while ρB,t+1 is the marginal













F (At) ≡ R−r




Figure 3 expresses the demand for each risky asset, F(At) (FF schedule), as a function
of the measure of intermediate industries which are active. The FF schedule is upward
sloping, implying that there is complementarity in the demand for risky assets: the
demand for each asset g r o w sw i t ht h ev a r i e t yo fi n t e r m e d i a t ei n d u s t r i e s .
Complementarity arises because the more active are intermediate industries, the bet-
ter is risk-diversiﬁcation. Thus, as At increases, savers shift their investments away of
the safe asset into high-productivity risky projects (the “stock market”). Such comple-
mentarity hinges on risk aversion being suﬃciently high.47 In general, similar to Young
(1993), an increase in A creates two eﬀects. On the one hand, investments in the stock
market become safer because of better diversiﬁcation opportunities, which induces com-
plementarity. On the other hand, investments are spread over a larger number of assets,
inducing substitution. With suﬃciently high risk aversion, including the unit CRRA
speciﬁcation upon which we focus, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.
The equilibrium measure of active industries, A∗
t, is determined (as long as A∗ < 1)





In ﬁgure 3, the equilibrium is given by the intersection of schedules FF and MM, where
the latter represents the distribution of minimum size requirements across industries. In-
tuitively, A∗
t is the largest number of industries for which the technological non-convexity
can be overcome, subject to the demand of securities being given by (71).48
Growth increases wage income and the stock of savings over time. In equilibrium,
this induces an expansion of the intermediate industries, A∗
t. This can once more be seen
47Suppose agents were risk averse, but only moderately so. Suppose, in particular, that they were
so little risk-averse that they would decide not to hold any safe asset in their portfolio. Then, an
expansion in the set of risky securities would induce agents to spread their savings (whose total amount
is predetermined) over a larger number of assets. In this case, assets would be substitutes rather than
complements.
48Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) show the laissez-faire portfolio investment to be ineﬃcient. Eﬃciency
would require more funds to be directed to industries with large non-convexities, i.e., agents not holding
a balanced portfolio. The ineﬃciency is robust to the introduction of a rich set of ﬁnancial institutions.
39in Figure 3: growth creates an upward shift of the FF schedule, causing the equilibrium
to move to the left. Therefore, growth triggers ﬁnancial development. In particular,
when the stock of savings becomes suﬃciently large, the ﬁnancial market is suﬃciently
thick to allow all industries to be active. In the case described by the dashed curve,
FF’, the economy is suﬃciently rich to aﬀord A∗
t =1 . The inferior safe technology is
then abandoned. Financial development, speeds up growth by channelling investments
towards the more productive technology.











prob. 1 − A∗
t





t = A(Yt−1) ≤ 1 is the equilibrium measure of intermediate industries, such
that A0 ≥ 0.49 The ﬁrst line corresponds to the case of a “bad realization” at time t,
such that s ∈ (A∗
t,1]. In this case, none of the active intermediate industries turned out
to pay-oﬀ at time t, and capital at time t +1is only given by the return of the safe
technology. The second line corresponds to the case of a “good realization” at t,s u c h
that s ∈ [0,A ∗
t]. In this case, the risky investment paid oﬀ at time t, and capital and
output are relatively large at time t+1. Note that the probability of a good realization
increases with the level of development, since A0 (Yt−1) ≥ 0 (with strict inequality as
long as A∗ < 1).
FIGURE 4
Figure 4 describes the dynamics. The two schedules represent output at time t +1
as a function of output at time t conditional on good news (FG (Yt))a n db a dn e w s
(FB (Yt)), respectively. At low levels of capital (Y ≤ YL), the marginal product of capi-
tal is very high, which guarantees that growth is positive, even conditional on bad news.
I nt h ei n t e r m e d i a t er a n g ew h e r eY ∈ [YL,Y M],g r o w t ho n l yo c c u r si fn e w si sg o o d ,s i n c e
FB (Yt) <Y t <F G(Yt). The threshold YL is not a steady-state; however, it is a point
around which the economy will spend some time. When the initial output is below
YL, the economy necessarily grows towards it. When it is above YL, output falls back
whenever bad news occurs. So, in this region, the economy is still exposed to undi-
versiﬁed risks, and experiences ﬂuctuations and set-backs. Finally, for Y ≥ YM, there
are enough savings in the economy to overcome all technological non-convexities. When
the economy enters this region, all idiosyncratic risks are removed, and the economy
49Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) derive a closed-form solution for A∗
t that we do not report here.
40deterministically converges to YH.50
FIGURE 5
Note that it may appear as if, in the initial stage, countries striving to take oﬀ do
not grow at a sustained rate during long periods. The demand for insurance takes the
form of investments in low-productivity technologies, and poor economies tend to have
low total factor productivity and slow growth.
In the case described by Figure 4, the economies “almost surely” converge to a unique
steady-state. Diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model can, however, lead to less optimistic
predictions. With higher risk aversion, for instance, traps can emerge, as in the example
described in Figure 5. An economy starting with a GDP in the region [0,Y MM) would
never attain the high steady-state YH, and would instead perpetually wander in the
trapping region [0,Y LL]. Conversely, an economy starting above YM would certainly
converge to the high steady-state, YH. Finally, the long-run fate of an economy starting
in the region [YMM,Y M] would be determined by luck: an initial set of positive draws
would bring this economy into the basin of attraction of the good equilibrium. A single
set-back, however, would forever jeopardize its future development.51
The model can be extended in a number of directions. A two-country extension shows
that international capital ﬂows may lead to divergence, rather than convergence between
economies. This result is due to the interplay between two forces: ﬁrst, decreasing
returns to capital would tend to direct foreign investments towards poorer countries,
as in standard neoclassical models. Second, the desire to achieve better diversiﬁcation
pushes investments towards thicker markets. The latter force tends to prevail at some
earlier stages of the development process. So, poor countries suﬀer an outﬂow of capital,
which spills over to lower income and wages for the next generation, thereby slowing
down the growth process. The analysis of capital ﬂows, ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial
crises in the context of similar models is further developed in recent papers by Martin
and Rey (2000, 2001 and 2002). A diﬀerent extension of the model is pursued by
Cetorelli (2002) who shows that the theory can account for phenomena such as “club
convergence”, economic miracles, growth disasters and reversals of fortune.
50That the economy converges ”almost surely” to a steady-state where all risk is diversiﬁed away
only occurs under parameter restrictions ensuring that Y SS >Y1. Although the model presented here
is neoclassical and features zero growth in the long run, it is possible to augment it with spillover of the
learning-by-doing type, as in Romer (1986), and make it generate self-sustained growth.
51Consider, for instance, the limit case where agents are inﬁnitely risk-averse. In this case, agents
refuse to invest in the stock-market as long as this entails some uncertainty, i.e., as long as there are not
enough savings in the economy to open all industries. Thus, an economy starting above YM converges
to YH, while an economy starting below YM converges to YL,a n di ss t u c ki nap o v e r t yt r a p .
41Recent empirical studies analyze implications of the theory about the patterns of risk-
sharing and diversiﬁcation. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001, 2003) document that regions
with access to better insurance through capital markets can aﬀord a higher degree
of specialization. Using cross-country data at diﬀerent levels of disaggregation, Imbs
and Wacziarg (2003) ﬁnd robust evidence of sectoral diversiﬁcation increasing in GDP.
However, their ﬁndings also suggest that, at a relatively late stage of the development
process, the pattern reverts and countries once more start to specialize. This tendency
for advanced countries to become more specialized as they grow can be explained by
factors emphasized by the “new economic geography” literature (Krugman, 1991), from
which the theory described in this section abstracts, such as agglomeration externalities
and falling transportation costs.
7 Endogenous Fluctuations
In the models reviewed so far, the economies converge in the long run to balanced-growth
equilibria characterized by linear dynamics. Growth models with expanding variety
and technological complementarities can, however, generate richer long-run dynamics,
including limit cycles. In this section, we review two such models.
In the former, based on Matsuyama (1999), cycles in innovation and growth arise from
the deterministic dynamics of two-sector models with an endogenous market structure.
The theory can explain some empirical observations about low-frequency cycles, and
their interplay with the growth process. In particular, it predicts that waves of rapid
growth mainly driven by “factor accumulation” are followed by spells of innovation-
driven growth. Interestingly, these latter periods are characterized by lower investments
and slower growth. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Young (1995) that the growth
performance of East-Asian countries was mainly due to physical and human capital
accumulation, while there was little total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Accord-
ing to Matsuyama’s theory, the observation of low TFP growth should not lead to the
pessimistic conclusions that growth is destined to die-oﬀ. Rather, rapid factor accumu-
lation could set the stage for a new phase of growth characterized by more innovative
activity. The predictions of this theory bear similarities to those of models with Gen-
eral Purpose Technologies (GPT), e.g., Helpman (1999) and Aghion and Howitt (1998,
ch. 8). For instance, they predict that a period of rapid transformation and intense
innovation (e.g., the 1970’s) can be associated with productivity slowdowns. However,
GPT-based theories rely on the exogenous arrival of new “fundamental” innovations
generating downstream complementarities. In contrast, cycles in Matsuyama (1999) are
entirely endogenous.52
52Cyclical equilibria can also emerge in Schumpeterian models, due to the dynamic relationship be-
tween innovative investments and creative distruction. An example is the seminal contribution of Aghion
and Howitt (1992). More recently, Francois and Lloyd Ellis (2003) construct a Schumpeterian model
where entrepreneurs can decide to time the implementation of innovations (similarly to Shleifer, 1988).
In this model, agents time the implementation so as to proﬁt from buoyant demand and maximize the
duration of their leadership. This mechanism leads to a clustering of innovations and endogenous cycles.
While this model can explain some features of ﬂuctuations at business cycle frequencies, Matsuyama’s
model is better suited for the analysis of long waves.
42In the latter model, based on Evans et al. (1998), cycles in innovation and growth
are instead driven by expectational indeterminacy. The mechanism in this paper is
diﬀerent, as cycles hinge on multiple equilibria and sunspots. Some main predictions
are also diﬀerent: contrary to Matsuyama (1999), the equilibrium features a positive
comovement of investments and innovation. The main contribution of the paper is to
show that cycles can be learned by unsophisticated agents holding adaptive expectations.
Thus, the predictive power of the theory does not rest on the assumption that agents’
expectations are rational and that agents can compute complicated dynamic equilibria.
7.1 Deterministic Cycles
Matsuyama (1999) presents a model of expanding variety where an economy can perpet-
ually oscillate in equilibrium between periods of innovation and periods of no innovation.
Cycles arise from the deterministic periodic oscillations of two state variables (physical
capital and knowledge). Unlike the model that will be discussed in the next section, the
equilibrium is determinate and there are no multiple steady-states.
More speciﬁcally, the source of the oscillatory dynamics is the market structure of the
intermediate goods market. Monopoly power is assumed to be eroded after one period.
The loss of monopoly power is due to the activity of a competitive fringe which can copy
the technology with a one-period lag. In every period, new industries are monopolized,
while mature industries are competitive. The proﬁts of innovators depend on the market
structure of the intermediate sector. The larger is the share of competitive industries
in the intermediate sector, the lower is the proﬁt of innovative ﬁrms, since competitive
industries sell larger quantities and charge lower prices. In periods of high innovation, a
large share of industries are monopolized, which increases the proﬁtability of innovation,
thereby generating a feedback. In these times, investment in physical capital is low due
to the crowding out from the research activity. Conversely, times of low innovation
are times of high competition, since old monopolies lose power and there are few new
ﬁrms. Thus, the rents accruing to innovative ﬁrms are small. In these periods, savings
are invested in physical capital, and while innovation is low, the high accumulation of
physical capital creates the conditions for future innovation to be proﬁtable.
Time is discrete. The production of ﬁnal goods is as in (3), where we set Ly =
L =1 . Intermediate goods are produced using physical capital, with one unit of capital
producing one unit of intermediate product, x. Innovation also requires capital, with
ar e q u i r e m e n to fµ units of capital per innovation. Monopoly power is assumed to
last one period only. Therefore, in period t, all intermediate inputs with an index
z ∈ [0,A t−1] are competitively priced, whereas all those with an index z ∈ [At−1,A t]
are monopolistically priced. The prices of competitive and non-competitive varieties
are pc
t = rt and pm
t = rt/α, respectively, where the superscript h ∈ {c,m} denotes the






















t rt (1 − α)/α.S i n c e
p a t e n t se x p i r ea f t e ro n ep e r i od ,πt is also the value of a monopolistic ﬁrm at the beginning





t ≤ µ, (74)
with equality holding when innovation is positive.
Capital is assumed to fully depreciate after each period. The stock of capital can


















where we have used (73) and (74) to eliminate xc
t and xm
t . As shown by (75), there
exists a threshold to the capital-knowledge ratio that triggers positive innovation. In
particular, innovation occurs if Kt−1/At−1 ≥ α
− α
1−α (1 − α)
−1 µ ≡ kL.I fKt−1/At−1 <k L,
then, all capital is allocated to intermediate production, all intermediate industries are







In this case, an economy is said to be in a “Solow regime”, with decreasing returns to
capital. Since there is no investment in innovation, A is constant and the dynamics has
a neoclassical character. In contrast, if Kt−1/At−1 ≥ kL, then a positive share of the
















Using (75) and simplifying terms, this equation can be written as:
Yt = DKt−1, (77)
where D ≡ (kL)
−(1−α) . In this case, the returns to capital are constant, like in endogenous
growth models, and the economy is said to be in a “Romer regime”.53
For tractability, we assume a constant savings rate, implying that Kt = sYt.54 Deﬁne
kt = k
−1
L · Kt/At as the (adjusted) capital-to-knowledge ratio. Then, standard algebra
using (75), (76) and (77) establishes the following equilibrium law of motion:
kt = f (kt−1)=
(
sDkα




1−α (kt−1−1) if kt−1 ≥ 1 . (78)
53Zilibotti (1995) ﬁnds similar dichotomic equilibrium dynamics in a one-sector model with learning-
by-doing spillovers. Economies may converge to a stationary steady-state with “Solow dynamics” or
embark on a virtuous path of “Romer dynamics” with self-sustained growth. Cycles cannot arise in
equilibrium, while multiple self-fulﬁlling prophecies exist.
54Matsuyama (2001) relaxes this restriction and characterizes equilibrium by a second—order diﬀerence
equation. Some of the main results, like the existence of a period-2 cycle, survive this generalization.
44The mapping kt = f (kt−1) has two ﬁxed points. The ﬁrst is k =0 , the second can either
be k =( sD)
1
1−α ≡ ˆ k1, if sD ≤ 1, or k =1+α
α
1−α (sD − 1) ≡ ˆ k2, if sD ≥ 1.I n t h e
former case, the ﬁxed point lies in the range of the “Solow regime”, while in the latter,
it lies in the range of the “Romer regime”.55
Three cases are possible:
1. If sD ≤ 1, the economy converges monotonically to k = ˆ k1.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e
economy never leaves the Solow regime, and there are no innovative investments.
The neoclassical dynamics converge to a stagnating level of GDP per capita.






, then capital ﬁrst monotonically accumulates in
the Solow regime, with no innovation. The economy overcomes the development
threshold, k =1in ﬁnite time, and the process of innovation starts thereafter.
Eventually, the economy converges to the BG equilibrium ˆ k2 in an oscillatory
fashion. In the BG, capital and knowledge are accumulated at the same positive
rate, and income per capita grows over time.
3. if sD ∈ (1,α
− α
1−α − 1], the economy does not converge asymptotically to any BG
equilibrium, and perpetually oscillates in the long run between the Solow- and the
Romer-regime. This case is described by Figure 6. On the one hand, there is no
steady-state in the Solow-regime, which rules out that the economy can be trapped
in a stable equilibrium with no innovation. On the other hand, the steady-state ˆ k2
is locally unstable and cannot be an attractor of the dynamics in itself. Instead,
there exists a period-2 cycle, such that one of the periodic points lies in the Solow
regime (kS), while the other lies in the Romer regime (kR).56 The period-2 cycle
is not necessarily stable, and if it is unstable, the economy can converge to cycles
of higher periodicity or feature chaos. A general property of the dynamics is that
the economy necessarily enters the region Iabs =[ f(f (1)),f(1)] (shaded in ﬁgure
6), and never escapes from it.57
FIGURE 6


















∈ (−1,0) if sD > α
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are used to establish the results discussed below.
56A period-2 cycle exists if, given a mapping xt+1 = f (xt),f(f(.)) has ﬁxed points other than the
ﬁxed point of f(.).As u ﬃcient condition is that (i) f(.) is continuous, (ii) there exists a closed, ﬁnite
interval, I, such that f(I) ⊂ I and (iii) f(.) has an unstable ﬁxed point. (i) and (iii) are clearly satisﬁed;
(iii) is established in the next footnote for the interval Iabs.
57To prove this result, two properties of the mapping need to be shown. First, f (·) must be unimodal,
i.e., (i) f (·) must be continuous; (ii) f (.) must be increasing in some left-hand neighborhood of 1 and
decreasing in some right-hand neighborhood of 1. Second, it must be the case that f (f (1)) < 1. That
f is unimodal is immediate by inspection. After some algebra, it can also be proved that f (f (1)) < 1.
45In the case described by Figure 6, the model predicts that a poor economy would ﬁrst
grow through capital accumulation, and eventually enter the absorbing region Iabs. Then,
there is an alternance of periods of innovation and periods of no innovation. GDP per
capita grows on average, but at a non-steady rate, and there are cycles in the innovative
activity. Interestingly, output and capital grow more quickly in periods of no innovation
(Solow regime) than in periods of high innovation (Romer regime). Another implication
is that if an economy grows quickly, but has a low TFP growth, this does not imply
that growth will die-oﬀ. Rather, fast capital accumulation can create the conditions for
future waves of innovation, and viceversa.
7.2 Learning and Sunspots











where ζφ = α. This speciﬁcation encompasses the technology (3), in the case of φ =1 ,
and allows intermediate inputs to be complements or substitutes. They focus on the
case of complementarity (φ>1), and show that in this case, the equilibrium can feature
multiple steady states, expectational indeterminacy and sunspots. They emphasize the
possibility of equilibria where the economy can switch stochastically between periods of
high and low growth.
Time is discrete, and intermediate ﬁrms rent physical capital from consumers to
produce intermediate goods. One unit of capital is required per unit of intermediate
good produced. Capital is assumed not to depreciate. The resource constraint of this
economy is:






where χ(.) is a function such that χ0 > 0,χ 00 ≥ 0. If there are no costs of adjustment,
then, χ(x)=x. If χ00 > 0, there are convex costs of adjustments.
By proceeding as in section 2, we can characterize the equilibrium of the intermediate









1−αL are two positive constant. We
denote by pK the relative price of capital, expressed in terms of the consumption good
numeraire. If there are no adjustment costs, then, pK =1while, in general, pK = χ0 (.).
Note that proﬁts increase with A,a sl o n ga sφ>1.
58Note that ﬁrms rent, and do not own, their capital stock. Adjustment costs are borne at the
aggregate level, not at the level of each decision unit. Therefore, it continues to be legitimate to
write the proﬁt maximization problem for intermediate producers as a sequence of static maximization
problems.
46Two technical assumptions ensure that the model has BG properties. First, the de-
sign of a new good requires A
ξ
t units of output. Second, innovative investments incurred








In a BG equilibrium, consumption and capital grow at the common rate, γ. When φ>1,
this rate exceeds the growth rate of technical knowledge, γA ≡ At+1/At.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
it can be shown that γ = γ
1+ξ











which is the analogue of equation (13) in the benchmark model.
The model is closed by the (discrete time) Euler equation for consumption:
γ =[ β (1 + r)]
1
σ , (83)
where β is the discount factor. Equations (82) and (83) fully characterize the equilibrium.
FIGURE 7
Figure 7 provides a geometric representation for the case of logarithmic preferences
and zero adjustment cost (pK =1 ). The SS curve is linear, with the slope β
−1.T h e
DD curve is also positively sloped. In the case represented, the two curves cross twice,
thereby implying that there are two BG equilibria featuring positive innovation and
growth (points X and Y ).
Standard stability analysis is inappropriate for dynamic models with perfect fore-
sight. It is possible, however, to analyze the expectational stability (E-stability) of the
BG equilibria. E-stability is tested as follows. Set an arbitrary initial level for the ex-
pected interest rate re, and let agents choose their optimal savings plan according to
(83). This implies a notional growth rate of consumption and capital, as determined by
the SS curve. Next, ﬁrms take action. At the notional growth rate, there is a unique
interest rate consistent with the no-arbitrage condition implied by (82), as shown by the
DD curve. The composition of these two operations deﬁne a mapping from an expected
to a realized interest rate:
rt = T (r
e
t). (84)
47A perfect foresight BG equilibrium is a ﬁxed point to the mapping, r = T (r). After
consumers have observed the realized interest rate, they update their expectations about





t + ψt (rt − r
e
t), (85)
where ξt = ψ/t. The sequence {ψt} determine how sensitive the expectations are to past
errors, and it is known as the gain sequence. (84) into (85) deﬁnes a dynamic system,
whose stability can be analyzed by linearization techniques. In general, expectational
stability occurs whenever T 0 (r) < 1,w h e r er is the steady-state interest rate.59
An inspection of Figure 7 shows the equilibrium X to be E-stable, while the equilib-
rium Y is not. Let re
X and re
Y denote two expected interest rates which are below the
equilibria X and Y , respectively. Then, in the case of the equilibrium X, T (re
X) >r e
X,
and the adaptive adjustment moves the economy towards the equilibrium, inducing con-
vergence. In contrast, in the case of the equilibrium Y , T (re
Y) <r e
Y, and the adaptive
adjustment moves the economy away from the equilibrium, thereby inducing divergence.
In the case analyzed so far, only one BG is E-stable, and E-stabilty can be used as
a selection criteria. It is possible, however, that multiple E-stable BG equilibria exist in
the general model with convex adjustment costs.
FIGURE 8
Figure 8 describes a case with four steady-states, two of them being E-stable. Equi-
libria such as X and Z are E-stable (note that T (re
X) >r e
X and T (re
Z) >r e
Z). Moreover,
in the neighborhood of these equilibria, there exist stationary sunspot equilibria. In one
such equilibrium, the economy switches stochastically between two points in the neigh-
borhood of X and Z, respectively, with switching probabilities given by a time-invariant
transition probability matrix. The fact that both X and Z a r eE - s t a b l ei ss u ﬃcient for
any stationary sunspot equilibrium in their neighborhood to be E-stable in itself.60
We conclude that a modiﬁed version of the model of growth with expanding vari-
ety can generate endogenous ﬂuctuations. The key assumptions are complementarity
between capital goods and convex adjustment costs to capital. The former assump-
tion guarantees the existence of multiple BG equilibria, around which sunspot equilibria
can be constructed. The latter assumption guarantees that the sunspot equilibrium is
expectationally stable, i.e., it can be learned through adaptive expectations.
59See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a state-of-art analysis of expectational indeterminacy.
60For general discussion of sunspot equilibria, see Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), Grandmont (1986)
and Azariadis (1993).
48The model assumes increasing returns to physical and knowledge capital. The re-





where KF = Ax denotes aggregate capital used in intermediate production. Empirical
estimates suggest that α ≤ 0.4, which implies that the lower bound to the output
elasticity of knowledge to generate multiplicity is φ − α =0 .6. Evans et al. (1998)
provide a numerical example of an E-stable sunspot equilibrium, assuming φ =4 . Recent
estimations from Porter and Stern (2000) using patent numbers report φ−α to be around
0.1, however. Therefore, the model seems to require somehow extreme parameters to
generate endogenous ﬂuctuations.
Augmenting the model with other accumulated assets, such as human capital, may
help obtain the results under realistic parameter conﬁgurations. This is complicated
b yt h ep r e s e n c eo fs c a l ee ﬀects in the expanding variety model. However, in a recent
paper, Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001) formulate a version of the model with human capital
accumulation and without scale eﬀects. In their model, both human capital (embodied
knowledge) and technical change (disembodied knowledge) are used to produce ﬁnal
goods. The scale eﬀect is avoided by congestion eﬀects in the accumulation of human
capital. An interesting feature of this model is that, unlike other recent models without
scale eﬀects, positive long-run growth in income per capita does not hinge on positive
population growth.
8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have surveyed recent contributions to growth theory inspired by
Romer’s (1990) expanding variety model. Key features of the theory are increasing
returns through the introduction of new products that do not displace existing ones
and the existence of monopoly rents providing an incentive for ﬁrms to undertake costly
innovative investments. This model has had a tremendous impact on the literature, and
we could only provide a partial review of its applications. Then, we decided to focus
on a few major themes: trade and biased technical change, with their eﬀects on growth
and inequality, ﬁnancial development, complementarity in the process of innovation and
endogenous ﬂuctuations.
While only being a limited selection, these applications give a sense of the success
of the model in providing a tractable framework for analyzing a wide array of issues in
economic growth. In fact, we have shown how the model can incorporate a number of
general equilibrium eﬀects that are fundamental in the analysis of trade, wage inequal-
ity, cross-country productivity diﬀerences and other topics. Further, while the original
model has linear AK-dynamics, we have surveyed recent generalizations featuring richer
dynamics, which can potentially be applied to the study of ﬁnancial development and
innovations waves. Given its longevity, ﬂexibility and simplicity, we are convinced that
the growth model with horizontal innovation will continue to be useful in future research.
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